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CIS Summit To Go Ahead in Moscow 24 Sep

LD2309104693 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 0800 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Report by unidentified ITAR-TASS correspondent live from TASS newsroom—from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Heads of the Commonwealth states have already started arriving in Moscow this morning. By all accounts, as from tomorrow the Commonwealth will open up a new era in its joint history. Tomorrow, in the President Hotel, the heads of states will sign the main document—the treaty on setting up an economic union. Judging from the way things are, the creation of this union will not be easy, and certain problems which might arise during discussion of this question by the smaller CIS states are only to be expected. The reasons for such a conclusion could primarily be discerned from reports arriving from the republics—from Ukraine, in particular. We have learned that Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk has said that the proposed draft of the agreement does not suit Ukraine and goes against its legislation. In the president's opinion, Ukraine can join any economic treaties and agreements as well as take part in any economic unions so long as they are in the country's best interests, but only as an associate member.

I should like to add that the president of Turkmenistan has also expressed the same view; that is, he is in favor of participation in the economic union as an associate member. Only time will show how the discussion of this question will develop at the summit tomorrow.

Gaydar Interviewed on Ruble Zone Agreement

MK2209132893 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 22 Sep 93 p 3

[Interview with Yegor Gaydar by Mikhail Gurevich under the "Opinion of the Week" rubric: "Yegor Gaydar on the Zone and the Type. Border Under Lock and Key"]

[Text] As MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS already reported, its correspondent spoke with Yegor Timurovich Gaydar the same day, and virtually the same hour, that the government made its final decision on the latter's return to the government. Having talked about the quite probable "polyphony of positions" within the government, as well as about the quite obvious opposition to privatization—on the plea that it should be streamlined—and having remarked that "Chubays is a very tough man," Gaydar made some comments on the recently signed ruble agreement among six CIS republics.

[Gaydar] The movement toward a ruble zone of a new type is of course a rather natural, sensible, and logical process. That is, if one seeks only precisely the zone of a new type rather than revives the Union's ruble space—which is impossible. What is possible is to modify the fiscal exchange control, the main monetary policy institutions, to reconstruct the decisionmaking system, and on this basis, to enter the ruble zone of a new type while simultaneously introducing national replacement currencies.

Two things are important here. First, everybody should realize that we have different currencies. This is so that truckloads of Russian rubles are not shipped to Commonwealth neighbors. And so that people do not hope that Tajik rubles would by some miracle convert into dollars.

Second, I fear attempts to speed up this process. There cannot be any forward movement in standardizing the monetary system before all the prerequisites are in place, or before we are convinced that a mechanism has been created for the normal functioning of our money supply. This is to say that there should be no repetition of the situation where all the near abroad gets pumped full of Russian money, after which we try without much success to get the situation under control.

[Gurevich] The Kyrgyz som is worth several dollars, they say.

[Gaydar] The nominal value of a monetary unit is an initial factor having nothing to do with its power. If one dollar is worth 104 yen, this does not mean that the dollar is a strong currency and the yen is a weak currency.

[Gurevich] In the past, several years ago, according to the official rate of exchange, the ruble's value was higher than all other monetary units, and one dollar was equal to 54 kopecks.

[Gaydar] The question of the Kyrgyz som is thus far unclear, but I wish my counterparts there success in keeping up the national currency's rate. Look at the Baltics' currencies and the karbovanets, which they claimed at first would be worth four dollars. All those currencies in fact emerged from the Union ruble.

Defense Council Secretary on CIS Security

MK2209121293 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Sep 93 pp 1,3

[Interview with Lieutenant General Leonid Ivashov, secretary of the CIS Defense Ministers Council, by Sergey Borisov under "Security" rubric: "A Coalition Or a Military Union? CIS Defense Ministers Council Secretary, Lieutenant General Leonid Ivashov Favors the Union"; place and date not given]

[Text] [Borisov] Leonid Grigoryevich, on 31 July 1993 the Russian parliament was the last of the CIS member states to ratify the Treaty on Collective Security. Therefore the treaty has come into effect. Well, what happens next? What practical steps are being taken to translate the accords into life?

[Ivashov] If we disregard some procedural formalities involving the presentation of ratification instruments to

the depositary country, the Tashkent Treaty has come into force. As of today, however, it is merely a legal framework, a cornerstone in the edifice of the collective security system which is yet to be put up. This edifice is far from simple: It has many stories, with extremely complicated political, economic, and military structures and relations, which are still to be formed.

The very first thing that needs to be done is to work out a model for the Commonwealth collective security system and to determine the extent of integration in this system for each of the member states.

Further, a coherent plan is required for the stage-by-stage creation of all systems' elements and the consolidation of their functions. All this will call for political will, the development of a regulatory and legal foundation both at the interstate and the national levels, and also a readiness for practical actions.

[Borisov] You have mentioned the extent of integration by the members states in the collective security system. Does this mean that it can be different?

[Ivashov] First of all, a joint decision is needed by the signatories of the Tashkent Treaty as to which form of collective security we choose. This is either a coalition with allied relations but without coordinating bodies and joint command, or we are openly talking about a military and political bloc or alliance with a system of standing political and military bodies (following the NATO pattern) and unified military structures, or we are moving to a still more profound form of military integration which can presuppose the creation of coalition structures with supranational powers (at least, for a special period), with their decisions binding on all member states and with collective command over joint armed forces.

If no consensus is reached on any of the above forms, then a combination of different forms if possible—a hybrid of such interrelations, as it were, where some states agree to the coalition idea, others to a union, and still others to a complete unification of their military efforts and facilities.

By the way, the situation is approximately the same with the Joint Armed Forces.

[Borisov] Which form of cooperation is Russia prepared to accept now?

[Ivashov] Judging by the position of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, only the first option, i.e., a coalition. This means that military efforts should be pooled only in time of a military threat. The Belarus Republic's Defense Ministry advocates a similar position. Other parties to the treaty are ready to move further and go through with all measures involved in ensuring collective security in good time.

[Borisov] Which option is favored by the Main Command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces?

[Ivashov] Analyzing the general trends of CIS development, it can be concluded with a sufficient degree of certainty that integration processes in the Commonwealth are gaining momentum, while the recent moves toward creating an economic and financial union suggest that we are seeing now a shift from rhetoric to action. Therefore these processes cannot but affect the military sphere. In addition, it is the military which, supported by some heads of state, pressed the hardest on integration questions. The Commonwealth's first coordinating body after the Council of Heads of State and the Council of Heads of Government was military—the Council of Defense Ministers. Then, on 20 March 1992 the Main Command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces was formed. These two bodies became the initiators of regulating the division of the USSR military capacity on a legal interstate basis and prevented a chaotic rupture of military relations among the components of the former USSR. We hoped that CIS military structures would initiate the restoration of a defense union on a more equal basis, especially given that an overwhelming majority of career military servicemen in all CIS states are in favor of such a union, the restoration of a single defense space. The Main Command, naturally, could not but respond to such an intention, and Marshal Shaposhnikov's position on this score prior to the well-known conference on 15 July 1993 was clear and unambiguous: a defense union and joint armed forces.

The Main Command understood very well that a military commonwealth is capable of cooling the heads of some hotheaded politicians infested with nationalist ideas. Let us recall the all-army officers assembly in January 1992. It was a serious warning about the possible implications of wildcat division, but no one, with the exception of Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev, supported the officers' aspirations. As a result, today none of the sovereign states that have emerged on the territory of the former USSR has a serious defense capability equal to the extent of a possible threat to their security and territorial integrity.

The most terrible thing is that we, the military, the former members of one great family, are beginning to look at each other through gun sights, submitting to the evil will of politicians. It is no secret that in some places officers undergoing interviews to join national armed forces have been asked: "Will you be prepared to fight against Russia?"

The Main Command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces is for a deep military integration within the framework of the Commonwealth.

[Borisov] But the CIS Defense Ministers Council has adopted a decision to abolish the Main Command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces and reorganize it as the Headquarters for Coordination of Military Cooperation. How should this be regarded—as a step forward or a step back?

[Ivashov] Yes, this decision—or rather a proposal to the Council of Heads of State—was taken under the pressure

of certain circumstances, and far from objective ones. As secretary of the Defense Ministers Council, I may not criticize it. I can, however, foresee that the process—unless the presidents reaffirm this proposal by their decision—will move in the opposite direction, contrary to what is being done in other spheres. More than 50 agreements will have to be revised then, including the CIS Charter and the Collective Security Treaty. It would take more than a year for the Council of Heads of State and the Council of Heads of Government to do this, considering the schedule of their sessions and their crowded agendas. But the central question is: For the sake of what? In order to abolish the post of the supreme commander of the CIS Joint Armed Forces because he, according to a member of the Defense Ministers Council, towered above the defense ministers?

There are, however, more civilized ways of dealing with this question. For example, to appoint the supreme commander on a rotating basis from Commonwealth member states; not to fill this vacancy for the time being but to appoint an acting commander; to adjust his functions; and so forth. The structure of the Main Command can be changed, reducing or enlarging its composition, replacing inefficient officers and generals but not destroying the positive elements. This is especially true since even our opponents are not denying the need for the Main Command but are merely talking about the untimeliness of its creation.

[Borisov] What is the current condition of the Main Command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces?

[Ivashov] The same as that of any other structure over which the sword of abolition or reorganization is hanging.

Highly qualified specialists immediately received invitations to work for other establishments, and we have already lost a few officers of unique professions, such as international jurists, experts on interstate and interethnic relations, and others. All of them, by the way, hold candidate of science degrees.

Furthermore, morale is not what it was prior to 15 June this year. The main thing is that all prospective military cooperation development plans both for the current year and for 1994 are now hanging in the air and apparently it will not be possible to return to them until some six months later, i.e., after a reorganization.

One can only guess at who will stand to gain from this.

[Borisov] Allow me to go back to collective security problems. What, in your opinion, should be done now to provide an impetus to this extensive work involved in implementing the Tashkent Treaty?

[Ivashov] First of all, it is necessary to call a session of the Collective Security Council to approve its functions, the structure of its apparatus, and to map out top priority measures to create a mechanism to implement the treaty.

[Borisov] Is the Main Command not a body of the Collective Security Council, and is a general secretary needed after all?

[Ivashov] The post of the general secretary is stipulated under the treaty. This should be a sufficiently strong and authoritative personality. The general secretary will have to organize work to formulate military policy within the treaty framework, coordinate the implementation of measures to create a collective security system, and closely interact with all structures of the members states in charge of defense matters as well as with international organizations.

The Main Command should perform the functions of a purely military body and obey political decisions.

[Borisov] In other words, you are advocating the principle that the army is outside politics?

[Ivashov] In Russia, the army has never been outside politics, and I do not think it will be. The army is an instrument of politics and it should be treated as a serious factor of state policy. Attempts to exclude this super politicized institution from participation in political affairs are therefore naive dreams. This could be proclaimed, as has been done in the constitutions and laws of some CIS states, but it is hard to translate it into life. Is the participation by the military in elections, referendums, and in the general political life of society not a contribution to the formation of the country's political course? The army in the present conditions is, moreover, the most organized political state institution.

Nonetheless, the army must not impose political solutions; it may propose them and participate in the formulation of military policy and then execute the decisions made.

[Borisov] Today, however, a course has been proclaimed in Russia toward the creation of a professional army, while people are going to Tajikistan to serve under contract, i.e., for money....

[Ivashov] First of all, both the Soviet and the Russian armed forces are a highly professional army. The leading role here is played not by the method of raising it but by the level of training.

When USSR Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov first visited the United States, they demonstrated to him the not quite successful activities of the 82nd Airborne Division. The marshal asked General Vladislav Achalov, commander of the Soviet Airborne Troops who was with him at the time, to assess these activities. Achalov told the minister with a soldier's bluntness: "For such activities I would have been discharged."

On the other hand, what the paratroopers of the Tula division had to demonstrate to the U.S. Defense Secretary who arrived on a reciprocal visit to the USSR caused both delight and concern among the U.S. military

delegation. The level of training of the Soviet paratroopers was far higher, in spite of the fact that all the men in the U.S. 82d Airborne Division serve under contract.

As for our boys in Tajikistan, I am sure that they are not going there for money. I shall cite the words of one of them published in the 14 September issue of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA: "If we leave the area today, a massacre will start here tomorrow. After that a real war will start."

Are these the words of a mercenary? These are the words of a major politician.

[Borisov] Do you believe that a defense union will be formed in the CIS?

[Ivashov] I believe in the wisdom of the Commonwealth peoples and in the common sense of political forces that realistically assess the current situation and are undertaking effective steps to overcome it. Nationalism and separatism are suffering a defeat.

Increasing numbers of people are seeing that the Belovezhskaya Forest collusion [sgovor], the separation of the once single people is not a natural process but a historical zigzag. And if this is so, the course of history will straighten it out.

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 23 Sep

LD2309065493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0531 GMT 23 Sep 93

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow September 23, ITAR-TASS—All the newspapers focus their attention today on President Yeltsin's decree "on the stage-by-stage constitutional reform in the Russian Federation." NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA carries an article on this subject, entitled "Power Has Put Russia on the Brink of a Catastrophe. Boris Yeltsin actually imposed presidential rule. The parliament and the vice president are trying to create an alternative system of power. The slightest provocation or another irresponsible step by each of the sides may lead to a civil war." It says: "When analysing the presidential decree, dated September 21, which was the reasons for his removal from office, one should admit that it is one of the best decrees coming from his administration, because of its skilful arguments. For instance, on the second page of the decree, after the habitual references to the results of the referendum and complaints of the pressure exerted by the Supreme Soviet, it is explained why the announcement of new elections does not run counter to the will of the people, expressed on April 25: This is not pre- term elections to the congress the way it was before, but new elections to a new type of parliament. Thus, the form for the president is more important, than the essence.

The will of the people to decide their destiny by themselves also permitted the president to suspend the work of the legislative branch of power which adopted a number of legal acts contradicting each other. Yeltsin refused to abide by those legal acts formally. Thus, in this case, he preferred essence to the form..."

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA carries an article by Grigoriy Yavlinsky, a well-known Russian economist, who believes that "although there are objective economic and political reasons for the current worsening of the political crisis, the behaviour of the executive and legislative branches of authority on the federal level is of decisive importance. All are guilty. Neither the president, nor the parliament have the right to shirk responsibility for what is going on. They are responsible for it in equal measure. They are responsible for having preferred to act on the basis of what looked like principles, but not of the assessment of possible consequences of their actions. They are responsible for shallow compromises, which actually undermined confidence in the very idea of social harmony, for making advances to the regional elite for political purposes, for the lack of understanding what future they want for the country and what action they should take."

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA set forth the decrees of the president and Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy, as well as resolutions of the parliament, and write about the response of subjects of the federation to the developments in the country. They do not comment on the situation themselves.

Aside from publishing orders of various branches of power, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA devotes much attention to the subject of religion today. The meaning of its articles is that in the current situation the church should not remain aloof to politics.

PRAVDA published the resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, as well as numerous articles, all of which stress that "Boris Yeltsin's rebellion" has actually taken place in the country.

Admiral Warns Kiev on Taking Over Black Sea Fleet Property

LD2209203993 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1620 GMT 22 Sep 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Roman Zadunayskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 22 Sep—"If the Ukraine Defense Ministry does not stop its attempts to unilaterally bring under its own command the military units and installations of the Black Sea Fleet, I shall put the fleet on full combat readiness tomorrow and stop the Black Sea Fleet ships carrying out the peacekeeping mission in the Caucasus." Commander of the Black Sea Fleet Admiral Eduard Baltin stated this in his telephone conversation with Ukraine first deputy defense minister general, General Colonel Anatoliy Lopata, head of the Ukraine Armed Forces General Staff.

As Captain 2nd Rank Andrey Grachev, head of the Black Sea Fleet press center, informed the ITAR-TASS correspondent, Admiral Baltin in his conversation with the Ukrainian military commander accused the Ukraine Defense Ministry of "launching unprecedented privatization of the Black Sea Fleet units and installations while making use of the complicated political situation in Russia." The fleet commander noted that just in the past five days attempts were made to bring under the Ukraine command the Black Sea Fleet construction units in Yalta, Nikolayev, Evpatoriya, and other cities. A company of Ukrainian marines attacked positions of a tank regiment of the Black Sea Fleet coast troops and injured three servicemen.

Foreign Ministry Urges Cease-Fire in Georgia

LD2209155593 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1441 GMT 22 Sep 93

[Text] Moscow, 22 September (ITAR-TASS)—The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement today that reads:

"The hostilities launched on 16 September of this year by the Abkhazian side in violation of existing cease-fire accords are continuing. Housing districts of Sukhumi are being shelled, fighting is going on inside the town, and the number of casualties and extent of the destruction are growing. On 21 September, a Tu-134 civilian plane on a flight from Sochi to Sukhumi was shot down on its approach into Sukhumi airport.

"The government of Russia in its statement of 16 September called on the Abkhazian and Georgian sides to immediately cease hostilities and urgently return to implementing the peace plan.

"Russia is willing to continue its mission as mediator for the purposes of halting the bloodshed and ensuring that a comprehensive political settlement is reached.

"A cease-fire and any subsequent step toward a return to compliance with obligations under the Sochi agreement of 27 July of this year, will meet with a most favorable response from the Russian Government and will allow it gradually to lift the restrictions on economic and other ties between Russia and Abkhazia introduced as a result of the violations of this agreement. Under conditions of peace, Russia will be willing to develop the traditional, friendly ties with the people of Abkhazia and to take part in efforts to restore its economy."

Government To Resume Electricity Supply to Abkhazia

LD2209211993 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1716 GMT 22 Sep 93

[Text] Russia is to resume supplying electricity to Abkhazia on Wednesday [22 September], according to the President of the Russian Federation Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria, Valeriy Kokov. He told INTERFAX that he had reached agreement on this with President Boris Yeltsin during their Wednesday telephone conversation.

Oil Supplies to Azerbaijan Resumed

LD2209215893 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1900 GMT 22 Sep 93

[Text] ITAR-TASS reports that oil supplies from Russia to Azerbaijan were resumed today, as stipulated in intergovernmental agreements. You will recall that the two-month cessation of fuel supplies to Azerbaijan was provoked by Azerbaijan's nonpayment for previous supplies.

Commentary Views Karabakh Conflict

PM2209130193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Sep 93 First Edition p 6

["Commentary" by Karen Topchyan: "Karabakh Conflict Alarms Neighbors"]

[Text] Yerevan—The Karabakh conflict has tended of late to move into a qualitatively new stage, which might be described as "internationalization." In this case we are referring not to the persistent efforts for 18 months now by the international community and many interested states to bring about a peaceful settlement of the "oldest" confrontation on the territory of the former USSR. What we are referring to is the activation of states bordering the conflict zone.

Unfortunately, for a long time after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Russian Foreign Ministry's stance on the Karabakh problem was described by many political observers as unintelligible and ill-judged. In fact, the same policy was conducted in all the other regions of so-called nearby foreign parts.

The strategists on Smolenskaya Square were obviously not in tune with the underlying processes taking place in the republics of the former Union. So Russia gradually drifted away from the Baltic republics, Central Asia, and the Transcaucasus...

What was the result of this practice in the region of the Karabakh confrontation? Turkey and Iran, countries committed to their own strategic interests and to extending their own influence in the region, began to feel too free and easy in the geopolitical vacuum that had formed in the Transcaucasus after Moscow's "voluntary departure."

They see the Transcaucasus as a corridor leading to the Muslim world of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, which, moreover, is rich in natural resources, in particular oil and gas. For example, throughout last year and the first half of this, Ankara has taken very productive steps toward rapprochement with the Turkic-speaking republics of the former USSR, primarily with Azerbaijan. Since Abulfaz Elchibey, the country's former president, did not conceal his liking for Turkey.

Tehran officials did not miss the opportunity to make their mark either. They were rather insistent in offering their "services" as mediators in the settlement of the Karabakh conflict, probably believing it would enable them to return to the international community's bosom.

Incidentally, Turkey too has been trying, ever since the diplomatic internationalization of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem began, to be an impartial arbiter between the Azerbaijanis, who are ethnically close to them, and their neighbors, the Armenians.

The foreign policy departments of the United States, Britain, and Israel have also become more active in the region.

Now, though, we have the "return" of Moscow to the Transcaucasus. Maybe common sense has prevailed among politicians in Russia who are far from indifferent about where their country's geopolitical borders run. Certainly, the experienced Geydar Aliyev's assumption of office in Azerbaijan played a part, as did the rapid offensives by the Karabakh army, which, having taken control of a territory nearly twice the size of Nagorno-Karabakh itself, is now right up to the Azerbaijani-Iranian border.

Be that as it may, Russia is trying to repair the omission. This is indicated also by Moscow's active involvement in extinguishing another conflict—the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict—and also protecting Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan.

But while for instance, Colonel General Andrey Nikolayev, commander of the Russian border forces, was assuring President L. Ter-Petrosyan that Armenia's border is the border of the CIS, which no one will be permitted to violate, Turkey and Iran were conducting military exercises in direct proximity to the Armenian border. Turkish border guards were openly firing in the direction of Armenia. And Iranian armed subunits had crossed the Azerbaijani border in the vicinity of the Nakhidzhevan Reservoir. The latter fact was confirmed, incidentally, at a recent briefing by Grigoriy Karasin, the Russian Foreign Minister's official spokesman, and also by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher in a letter to his Armenian colleague Vagan Papazyan.

While this was going on, senior politicians in Ankara and Tehran made direct threats to Armenia. The main burden of them was an unequivocal warning to Yerevan about the serious consequences of further seizures of territory by Karabakh forces in Azerbaijan.

Apparently, there are two basic reasons for Turkey's and Iran's diplomatic maneuvers. The first is to demonstrate to the entire world that positions in the region have by no means been lost as a result of the activation of Russia's foreign policy. The second reason is the rivalry between Tehran and Ankara for spheres of influence, which has been going on for several centuries now. But Yerevan believes that it is unlikely to come to an actual clash between them on the territory of a third country when Russia is present again in the Transcaucasus.

The correctness of this conclusion is indicated by the results of the Azerbaijan leader's recent visit to Moscow. Aliyev's desire to see his country as part of the CIS will very probably entail the return of Russian forces both to Azerbaijan and as a peacemaking force to Nagorno-Karabakh. The direct Karabakh-Azerbaijani talks, which have been going on for some weeks now under Moscow's patronage, have already led to a temporary truce on all war fronts. If the Karabakh conflict is at least "frozen" soon, this will not only be the most acceptable scenario for today on the road to an all-embracing peaceful settlement of the crisis in the region, but it will also strengthen Russia's position in the Caucasus.

Kozyrev Writes on Peacekeeping Efforts

MK2209083293 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Sep 93 p 1

[By Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev under the "Viewpoint" rubric: "Russia Is Bearing the Burden of Actual Peacemaking in Conflicts on the Perimeter of Its Borders Virtually Alone. And No One Will Do This for Her"]

[Text] At times, one gets the impression that the world community underestimates or does not fully realize what serious threats conflicts in the space of the former USSR pose to the cause of regional and universal peace. At the same time, some reservation, if not suspicion, is evident with regard to Russia's role in the settlement of conflicts.

These matters require complete clarity.

Russia, owing to its deep-rooted historical, political, cultural, and other ties to the neighboring countries could not and did not have the moral right to remain indifferent to their requests for help in bringing about peace. At a time when the world community was just starting to take a closer look at the "hot spots" in the former USSR, or even still trying to locate them on the map, Russia was the first to provide mediation and good services in the search for ways of settlement, as it came to the assistance of people suffering from hostilities,

including many hundreds of thousands of Russians and Russian-speaking people. Russian soldiers and officers had and sometimes still have to stand between the warring factions in order to avert bloodshed. In all cases without exception, Russia's peacemaking in the former USSR has been carried out with the consent and at the request of the conflicting parties. Peacemaking contingents are being sent to conflict areas on the basis of appropriate agreements. They are not at odds with the United Nations Charter. This was the case in South Ossetia and in the Dniester Region. Operations in Abkhazia and in Tajikistan are being prepared on the same basis. The United Nations and the CSCE have been regularly advised of these efforts. Moreover, the United Nations or the CSCE are present in virtually all these areas—by special missions, representatives, or observers. They are performing their functions appropriately there, and we appreciate this.

Russia and its neighbors have repeatedly proposed closer cooperation with the United Nations and the CSCE, but so far their responses to these proposals have been clearly insufficient. It seemed that things started getting off the ground when agreements reached in Sochi last July between Georgia and Abkhazia, with Russian mediation, were backed by the UN Security Council decision on deploying a UN observer mission in Abkhazia. So far, however, only 22 of 88 observers have arrived in the conflict area. In addition, Russia and Georgia, with Abkhazia's consent, called on the United Nations to send international peacekeeping forces to the conflict area and for the time being to use the Russian military contingent deployed in Sukhumi in this capacity. If this contingent had been reinforced substantially, and if our call had been heard in time at the United Nations, the foiling of the Sochi agreements and a new outburst of war in Abkhazia might have been prevented. However, the United Nations's reaction is still lacking, which, of course, does not justify our own sluggishness.

Presently, we are on the verge of making a similar choice in Nagorno-Karabakh. Whether we want it or not, there is no alternative to a Russian peacekeeping contingent there, which is to acquire the status of UN forces as soon as a settlement mechanism is in place and is to be reinforced by UN units from neutral European countries which are members of the CSCE. Here, both we and the United Nations must perform our historical duty. Shrinking from it would be irresponsible.

It is time to overcome both our "internal" sluggishness and the indecisiveness of the world community with regard to Russia's peacemaking efforts in the space of the former USSR. This is not a "neo-imperial" but still a unique kind of geopolitical space, where no one would advance the cause of peace in Russia's stead. At the same time, this is an inalienable part of the global system of international relations, which abides by universal standards of law and is simultaneously undergoing cardinal changes. "Classical" yardsticks which the United Nations applied to peacekeeping operations dozens of years ago are now unsuitable. We, however, hear doubts: Is it correct for conflicting parties and a "neighboring country" to take part in peacekeeping contingents? This is allegedly at odds with UN practice. We should, however, proceed from real life, not from a scheme, all the more so because new approaches have already proved their efficiency, as in the Dniester Region and South Ossetia.

Obviously, as in any other undertaking, let alone a new one, mishaps are bound to occur, but does this really mean that the answer is to give up when confronted by difficulties? The United Nations should assimilate this experience tested in real life, enriching it with its international authority and fine tuning its practice. As a matter of fact, in other operations—for example, in Somalia—the United Nations is already introducing new tactics into its peacekeeping rules (however, without much success).

For two years already, frankly speaking, Russia alone has borne the heavy financial burden of actual peacemaking in conflicts on the perimeter of its borders. At the same time, the military effort of soldiers and officers from Russia and her partners has been paid hundreds of times less than is the case with United Nations operations—and this is at a time when we have been regularly charged multimillion dollar contributions to pay for UN peacekeeping operations in distant regions.

Russia recognizes her obligations with regard to the United Nations. But the United Nations is a universal organization, and it should also recognize that the efforts of Russia and her neighbors to ensure peace and stability in the space of the former USSR have at least as much importance for regional and international security as, say, the resolution of crises in Central America. We are convinced of the need for genuinely interested involvement and real assistance, not just sympathetic attention, on the part of the international community.

Russia, of course, will not leave its neighbors and friends alone despite everything. But unless we find political will and actual means—let us be blunt: troops and hardware—for peacekeeping in the area of the former USSR, others will fill the vacuum, primarily forces of political extremism that threaten Russia itself.

However, resolving problems currently facing newly independent countries in cooperation with the world community and with the United Nations would prove simpler and cheaper for every one. The UN Secretary General, who spoke recently with NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, has repeatedly emphasized that any peacemaking efforts always cost less than making war, especially in terms of the most precious thing—human lives. It is time to translate these words into practical deeds and to add weight to the United Nations's support for the peacemaking efforts by Russia and her neighbors.

Ambassador Pankin Interviewed on Yeltsin 'Criticism'

PM2309082993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Sep 93 Second Edition p 3

[Aleksandr Krivopalov report: "Ambassador Pankin Is Surprised at the President's Criticism"]

[Text] London—After President Boris Yeltsin expressed the desire to release the Russian ambassador to Britain from his post, our London correspondent met with Boris Pankin.

This is what the ambassador declared:

"This is a complete surprise to me. Particularly as I was made a very serious offer literally three weeks ago. I will not name the country in question, but it was a very serious and very flattering offer in the president's name, which emphasized in every possible way my services, my profound knowledge of European and all other problems, and, most importantly, my ability to find my bearings in unusual situations.

"I declined that offer in a very correct manner. First, in the country which was offered me the present Russian ambassador has been working for no more than two years. I have great respect for him and I believe that, as follows from press reports, Lukin might also be refusing London for the same reasons.

"Second, I have been ambassador here for less than two years and I believe that it is simply too soon for me to leave here. It would make a bad impression.

"Third, on the whole I was planning to work as ambassador for no more than one year more. Then to devote myself entirely to creative work. Therefore a transfer to some new post, however honored and esteemed it might be, will tie me down for two or three years.

"What has been said against me, as you say—I did not know of this—evidently results from a misunderstanding and the president's incorrect information. It is my assumption that the source of such information could be the leadership of the present special services in Moscow, with whom I spoiled my relationship while I was still minister of foreign affairs—of which I am proud. I described their activity in highly critical tones in my book *100 Days Cut Short* [*Sto Obornannykh Dney*], which was recently published in Moscow. The book deals with the period between the putsch in August and the events in the Belovezhskaya Forest.

"If you were told one thing three weeks ago but later, now, some harsh criticism is made in public, you yourself would understand that it is hard to say what can have happened during these past three weeks."

Pankin Removal Viewed

PM2309093193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Sep 93 Second Edition p 3

[Aleksandr Shalnev report: "Foreign Intelligence Service Did Not Organize Intrigues Against Ambassador Pankin"]

[Text] At IZVESTIYA's request Boris Pankin, Russian ambassador to Britain, has commented on the report that at last Tuesday's session of the Presidential Council President Boris Yeltsin called for Pankin's removal as ambassador. In his comment he implied that the Russian special services might be behind the whole thing.

We asked Yuriy Kobaladze, director of the Foreign Intelligence Service press bureau, to comment on the ambassador's allegation. Kobaladze stressed that "we did not organize any intrigues against Pankin, nor do we intend doing so. As for Pankin's well-known position on the need to expel the intelligence service from the Foreign Ministry, these statements are absurd, especially since they come from an official. No intelligence service in the world can exist without cover."

Kozyrev Assesses Prospects for Cooperation With NATO

MK2309074993 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 39, 26 Sep 93 (signed to press 21 Sep) p A7

[By Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev under the "In the World" rubric: "What Is To Be Done With NATO?"]

[Text] Understandably, this question is being asked above all by NATO members themselves. In a post-confrontational and post-bloc world it is only natural, however, that it is being also raised in Russia.

Variations on the NATO theme have awakened old demons in us. Freeing the discussion from the rhetoric of the "Cold War" is enough to see clearly that the problem is not whether NATO is "bad" or "good." The problem is what it is that NATO policy will contribute to: to the neo-isolationism of some states, which would be ruinous both for them and the outside world, or to shaping a new, all-European security system.

NATO members themselves entertain the idea of changing the profile of their alliance. It is expected that strategic directions of the alliance's policy will be made public at the NATO Council's summit meeting in January 1994. So all participants in the discussion will have enough time and, hopefully, realism and responsibility to dot the i's.

From its inception, the new Russia said that it did not view NATO as even a potential enemy. One gets the impression that for NATO, too, a partnership with its former enemy is a key area of its activity. New forms of cooperation between NATO and Russia, and also other CIS countries, were discussed during a visit by the

alliance's delegation to Moscow, which has just ended. A regular session of the NATO Council in December is expected to approve steps aimed at diversifying military ties and cooperation in the conversion of military production to civilian uses. A noteworthy example of this cooperation is joint exercises in the Baltic Sea. The Russian Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry are considering a comprehensive program to foster cooperation between our country and NATO. Probably, as a result of mutual evolution, an opportunity may open up in the long run for Russia to join this organization.

I would like to recall another equally sensitive aspect to the problem. One of the first foreign policy steps of the new Russian leadership was renouncing the "Brezhnev doctrine" in East Europe. We respect the right of our neighbors to choose their friends and allies, which Russian President Boris Yeltsin emphasized once again during his recent visit to Poland. The sovereign right of each state to choose its own way of protecting its security, including through participation in military-political alliances, was also set forth in the Paris Charter for Europe.

Russia shows understanding with respect to the far from nostalgic memories of East Europeans about "cooperation" within the Warsaw Pact and to their concern for their own security, which goes back to our common totalitarian past. However, recognizing the East European states' right to make security decisions does not imply that Russia will abandon a constructive dialogue about what forms are most advisable for the fulfillment of this right. This is where the crux of the matter lies.

In our view, we should not cling to stratagems from the mothballed arsenal of "sanitary cordons," albeit in a refreshed packaging of alliances from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. In any event, it is not the increase in NATO's lineup playing on the European field that matters, but the reconstruction of the field itself and the adjustment of the rules of the game to new conditions.

Time has given convincing proof that the standoff between East and West, which until recently kept the world — a state of constant tension, has sunk into oblivion, ceding the "upper hand" to international and "internal" conflicts. The objective of tackling them efficiently cannot be achieved by a simple increase in NATO's membership. Moreover, this simplified path of NATO's transformation is bound to bring about a kind of hidden confrontation and, ultimately, instability.

If we talk about the need for "advancing joint defense boundaries to the East" and for the collective protection of the CSCE's values, one should bear in mind the Asian borders of the states that make up the area of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council [NACC]. It is Russia which bears the main burden here, and NATO and other bodies have been called on to assist it in appropriate forms.

In a word, what is actually needed is to create an anti-crisis potential for all of Europe, above all through the CSCE and NACC, and also collective peacekeeping under the United Nations' guidance using all the possibilities, including NATO's experience and infrastructure. This could be a reliable guarantee of the security of democratic countries, including those of Central and East Europe.

Given that any decision in this area may either boost or jeopardize the prospects for partnership, there should be no rush in searching for the optimum answer to the aforementioned question. Presumably, the search could be pursued not only within NATO's think tanks, but also in the form of a dialogue between the bloc leaders and non-member states, as well as by conducting multilateral consultations, for instance within the NACC.

UK Defense Minister Visits Tula Paratroops Unit

LD2109190793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1440 GMT 21 Sep 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Rudenko]

[Text] Tula September 21 TASS—British Defence Minister Malcolm Rifkind, British Ambassador to Russia Brian Foll and a group of British Army commanders have visited the Tula-based paratrooper unit on Tuesday [21 September].

The guests familiarized themselves with combat training of paratroopers and watched them making paratrooper and shooting exercises.

Later in the day, the British guests visited the regional museum of arms where they were acquainted with the history of one of the largest and oldest arms-producing centres and were shown specimens of modern weapons produced there.

Delegation Head on Ankara Arms Fair

PM2109130593 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Sep 93 p 3

[Interview with Viktor Puzanov, leader of the Russian delegation to the Ankara defense fair and chief engineer of the Moscow Aviation Production Association, by Valentin Rudenko; place and date not given: "IDEF-93 Offers Opportunity: International Exhibition of Defense Sectors of Industry Opens in Ankara, the Turkish Capital, Today"]

[Text] Our defense sector has probably never before known such a profusion of international fairs as this September: The start of the month was marked by the Moscow Air and Space Show, immediately followed by the "Conversion: Arms and Military Equipment" exhibition and fair in Nizhniy Novgorod, which finished yesterday, and today it is the turn of IDEF-93, the exhibition of defense sectors of industry.

Your correspondent asked Viktor Puzanov, leader of the Russian delegation to IDEF-93 and chief engineer of the

Moscow Aviation Production Association [MACA], what the aircraft builders at Russia's oldest association will be exhibiting there.

[Rudenko] Viktor Mikhaylovich, the MACA has the biggest display in the Russian section of IDEF-93 as, incidentally, it had at the Le Bourget and Moscow air shows. Why do you pay so much attention to international fairs?

[Puzanov] First of all, of course, there is the desire, so to speak, to see others and show yourself. There is simply no better way invented to date to make your voice heard, to establish contacts with foreign partners, and to determine what your standards are like than to take part in international fairs and air shows.

Over past years our association has supplied more than 3,000 fighter planes to dozens of countries in the world. We thought we were well known everywhere. But when we acquired the right to sell our military equipment abroad independently—albeit, naturally, under state supervision—and began to carry out direct negotiations with our customers, we realized that this was far from the case. We now have to plug the gap.

[Rudenko] And how effective have your efforts been?

[Puzanov] I won't say that we are 100-percen[illegible]lied with our work—much still has to be taken on bo[illegible]t today the MACA's specialists are able to negotiate in a thoroughly professional way, are well informed about conditions in the world aviation market, and, without being immodest, have succeeded in establishing a certain image for our association in international business circles.

We were again able to see this for ourselves, incidentally, at the Le Bourget and Moscow air shows. We had interesting and productive talks with delegations from Germany, India, Malaysia, Syria, Iran, China, South Korea, and a number of other countries.

Particularly attractive proposals, in my view, were forthcoming from representatives of Chile, who have invited us to an exhibition next March. From talking to the leaders of the Chilean delegation we learned that a number of Latin American countries are very interested in our MIG-29 fighter. We have real hopes pinned on the fair in Turkey too.

[Rudenko] But Turkey is a member of NATO and is scarcely going to buy our fighters, is it?

[Puzanov] But we are not expecting that. We see the Turkish fair primarily from the perspective of organizing some joint ventures and establishing new contacts. Delegations from the majority of countries of the Near East region have come to Ankara. Many of them are equipped with our fighters. I would not want to anticipate events, but I think we will certainly have talks with them on the subject of delivering spare parts.

I hope that the technological designs of ours which we are demonstrating at this exhibition will not go unnoticed. We are open to anyone who wants to develop technical cooperation with us and is ready to supply partners with technology and the requisite licenses.

[Rudenko] Could you give us a brief, off-the-cuff overview of what you are exhibiting? What sort of technology are you showing here?

[Puzanov] There is really no need to describe all the exhibits. Much of what we are exhibiting is of interest to and understood by only a narrow group of specialists. Take, for example, the rotating-electrode torch designed for any automatic closed-circuit welding operation. That is an example of our expertise. One poster illustrates a technique for case-hardening (strengthening the surface layer of steel) in a boiling medium. Its use enables labor costs to be reduced several times over and substantially improves the quality of the parts manufactured.

[Rudenko] Could you say why are you not demonstrating the MIG-29 "live," as it were? It is far more impressive than these bits of metal and posters...

[Puzanov] It may be more impressive but it is scarcely worth flying it down here. The fighter is well known in the Near East, and no one doubts its merits. The doubt lurks elsewhere—will we be able to ensure its continuous operation throughout its design lifetime. It has to be admitted that we thoroughly sullied our reputation in the past through our unreliability and extremely poor servicing record.

We have come to Turkey with a package of specific proposals on new approaches to servicing fighters operated abroad, including joint ventures and regional technical centers, on the delivery of spare parts guaranteed to world standards, and on modernizing the MIG-21, the MIG-23, and, above all, the MIG-29.

Romanian Prime Minister on Relations Prior to Visit

LD2209102893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0942 GMT 22 Sep 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nikolay Morozov]

[Text] Bucharest September 22 TASS—"We must by no means proceed from the principle that we can exist without each other," Romanian Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu, who will pay an official visit to Russia from September 27-29, told ITAR-TASS.

"The dialogue between Bucharest and Moscow, both busy with their domestic problems, has lately been stagnating," the premier said. "This sharp decline of traditional bilateral relations is unnatural. No matter what significant aid we receive from the West, the main role will nevertheless be played by our own efforts and by cooperation with our neighbours. The present level of

trade is far from what could be expected from it. There is no justification for the cooling of our relations," Vacaroiu stressed.

Yeltsin Appoints New UNESCO Permanent Envoy

LD2209132293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1144 GMT 22 Sep 93

[Text] Moscow September 22 ITAR-TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin on Wednesday [22 September] appointed Mikhail Fedotov as Russia's ambassador to UNESCO. V. Lomeyko, who held the post before, is released of his duties in connection with transfer to another job, the press service of the president told ITAR-TASS.

Kozyrev Receives PRC Ambassador for Talks

LD2209214493 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1900 GMT 22 Sep 93

[Text] A meeting took place today between Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and Wang Jinqing, ambassador of the People's Republic of China to Russia. ITAR-TASS reported that the two sides gave a positive appraisal of the development of Russian-Chinese relations. They also discussed preparations for a meeting in New York between the foreign ministers of Russia and China.

Doubt Cast on Yeltsin October Japan Trip

PM2209104793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Sep 93 First Edition p 4

[Sergey Agafonov report: "Japanese Get Ready for Visit, But Do Not Expect the Visit Itself To Take Place"]

[Text] Tokyo—The Japanese mass media report, citing talkative sources in the Russian capital, that the dates for President Yeltsin's visit to Japan have been provisionally designated—12-14 October—with a possible extension of the trip by one day, if the guest, in addition to visiting Tokyo, wishes to do any further sightseeing in Japan.

This optimistic leak, however, is accompanied by a whole string of provisos and suppositions which obviously convince one the opposite is the case—that despite the agreements on dates and "topic-related" work, the Japanese side is nevertheless inclined to assess the situation differently—the chances for the visit are small.

Unlike Moscow, where everything becomes known at the last moment, in Tokyo they prefer to fly a number of kites beforehand and to monitor fairly closely what happens. In the course of September, for instance, several stories convincingly explaining why Yeltsin would not be able to come to Tokyo in October were put into circulation at once—the first connected with difficulties of the internal political situation in Russia, the second with the president's health, and the third with the position of the Russian side, which is making it virtually a condition of the trip's going ahead that discussion of the territorial question be removed from the agenda—something definitely not to the liking of the Japanese. At the same time various influential people, including some occupying official posts, privately do not hide that, for all the talk of preparing for the glorious event, in actual fact no one expects Yeltsin's visit to happen this year; only particularly credulous people believe it will go ahead, and even incorrigible optimists do not promise anything special. Moreover, the Russian theme is inexorably losing its weight in Tokyo, firmly acquiring the designation of unpromising.

The naive hopes of some Russian experts that a change of team in Tokyo will make talks with the Japanese easier and make it possible to get relations out of the deadlock which they have reached, are extremely popular now, but life is nevertheless more complex, and it is better not to rely on speculative constructs, so as not to be disappointed yet again. After all, the situation as regards the new Japanese cabinet is similar to that which exists in our Fatherland—any shifts of position on the part of the government are watched closely by the conservative opposition, nationalist circles, and Japanese patriots, who formulate its task in clear-cut fashion: There must be no retreat from the hardline tone in the dialogue with Moscow; a solution to the territorial question must be sought, and the government must not fall for Russian tricks. And whereas earlier reference to internal political difficulties were exclusively a Russian trump card, now this trump is accessible to the same extent to the Japanese side also.

The situation is complicated also by Russia's amateurish performance in the sphere of declarations and statements of various kinds. The most recent example of this is the remarkable stubbornness with which the Russian premier is defending the "nonpresence" ["nenalichiye"] of the territorial question, referring in this not to his own understanding of the topic, but to the agreed position of the government. Whereas the government, as far as is known, differs above all with the approaches of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the president personally. Of course, you may not like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and you may not agree with the president on everything, but if so, you must cease to be a state functionary playing for the president's team. The subject is obviously ridiculous—such pluralism in foreign policy cannot be considered normal and attests only to the deep political malaise in Russia's top echelons.

The Japanese are also writing about this, justly ascribing the current Russian "originality" to a number of factors which can in no way promote the development of the positive in bilateral affairs. And if all the circumstantial evidence is gathered together, then it really is time to join the skeptics—what visit can there be against this type of background? The situation as a result comes out as ambiguous and is already becoming unseemly—12 October is just round the corner, yet the date of Yeltsin's visit has not been formally confirmed and the program

has not been compiled. Now one more guideline for clarity—the visit of the foreign minister to New York at the end of September. Whether the cherished "yes" will be heard at it, or whether once again reasons for "non-attendance" will be put forward, is an open question.

ROK Naval Vessels Visit Vladivostok

LD2209104393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0800 GMT 22 Sep 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yuriy Grachev]

[Text] Vladivostok September 22 TASS—A South Korean naval squadron, consisting of the frigates Chung Nam and Ul San, arrived here on Wednesday [22 September] for an official visit under the flag of Rear Admiral Yi Su-yong, commander of the First Fleet of the Navy of the Republic of Korea.

This is the first-ever visit here by a South Korean Naval squadron.

In a ceremonial atmosphere the squadron was welcomed by Vice- Admiral Igor Khmelnov, first deputy commander of Russia's Pacific Fleet, and Mr. Pak Myong-chung, consul-general of the Republic of Korea in Vladivostok.

During the official visit, which will continue until September 25, the South Korean ships will be open to visits by people of maritime territory.

Ex-Soviet Soldiers Refuse To Return From Afghanistan

LD2109215693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1600 GMT 21 Sep 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Sergey Staroselskiy and Vladimir Suprun]

[Text] Moscow September 21 TASS—Three ex-Soviet servicemen taken war prisoner in Afghanistan in the early 1980s told the Russian consul general in Mazar-i-Sharif today they do not want to return home "on religious reasons", head of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Information and Press Department Grigoriy Karasin told a briefing here today.

In his words, a Russian team has visited an Islamic Party unit in the Baghlan province to meet ex-Soviet servicemen Dubina, Olenin and Stepanov on consent of Afghan Prime Minister Hekmatyar. The ex- servicemen did not exclude a possibility of their meeting with relatives when "corresponding conditions shape up".

Noting the positive Russian role in the search and liberation of ex-Soviet servicemen missing or taken war prisoner in Afghanistan, Karasin noted the three made their choice voluntary.

Kremlin Silence on Scuds for Syria Deplored

PM2109141993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Sep 93 First Edition p 3

[Vladimir Nadein article: "Moscow Accused of Delivering Missiles From North Korea to Syria at the Very Moment When the Near East Is Moving Toward Peace"]

[Text] Washington—The delivery of spare parts for intermediate-range Scud missiles from North Korea to Syria by Russian transport aircraft is a topic which the United States is discussing actively, singling out two aspects.

First: Russia's violation of the spirit, if not the essence, of the memorandum of mutual understanding on questions of exporting rocket technology, recently signed by Viktor Chernomyrdin, attests to an unreliable partnership. Second: Extensive cooperation in space with Russia, which does not know how to keep its word, could prove very dangerous in the long term. Circles close to the U.S. military-industrial complex have initiated an anti-Russian campaign. They want to make Congress intervene in the treaty signed recently in Washington by Chernomyrdin and Vice President Gore.

Cooperation With Russia: Advantageous But Dangerous

In an article published in the weekly DEFENSE NEWS Frank Gaffney, director of the research Center for Security Policy, accuses the Clinton administration of concluding a loss-making deal with the Russian space industry. (The Russian opposition also accuses the Yeltsin government of approximately the same thing for the same reason.)

Gaffney makes no attempts to refute U.S. Vice President Gore's main thesis that cooperation with Russia is very advantageous to the United States. He emphasizes "the dangerous dependence of the United States on Russian carrier rockets for space launches," as well as the fact that the agreement "injects badly needed money and technologies into the former Soviet military-industrial complex."

"Carried away by his assumption that the end of the 'Cold War' has irrevocably transformed the former Soviet Union from the worst enemy into a reliable partner, Clinton does not see the risk associated with Gore's ambitious attempt to link important U.S. space activity with Moscow," the center's director writes. "As a result, the United States might find itself face to face with the worst of worlds: excessive dependence on a launch system belonging to a Russia whose foreign and defensive policy has once again come into conflict with our own."

The appeal which concludes the article—an appeal to Congress, which has met after the long August vacation, to "renounce the bad deal," as the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement is called—is repeated, this time with great

pressure, in an article carried Wednesday in a more influential publication: THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.

How the Air Carrier Will Respond

Entitled "How Russia is Continuing To Incite Terror in the Near East," this article has come from the pen of John Hannah, a former high-ranking U.S. State Department official and now deputy director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Without citing his source of information, the author reports that on 8 August a Russian transport aircraft delivered to Damascus, the Syrian capital, "a deadly load: components for Scud-C ballistic missiles capable of carrying chemical weapons and reaching targets deep inside Israel."

The author links the transport operation by Russian carriers (8 August) with the signing of the Chernomyrdin-Gore treaty in Washington (2 September) and the peace agreement between Israel and the PLO (13 September). In the first case he accuses Russia of violating the document which has just been signed, and in the second of intending to undermine peace in the Near East—right now, moreover, when "all eyes are on Syria."

If you consider the fact that at the beginning of August unresolved questions connected with the Indian rocket deal still existed between Moscow and Washington and if you recall that only one week before the meeting in Washington neither Premier Rabin nor Chairman 'Arafat had even thought of such an outcome, then the farfetched nature of these accusations becomes obvious.

What is more, it is so striking that it becomes important information in itself.

As far as I have been able to gather from several informal conversations, the powerful military-industrial lobby is preparing an attack in the U.S. Congress on the intergovernmental agreement on space cooperation. The purpose is to wreck ratification or, at the very least, to postpone it.

Clinton's Difficulties Have To Be Understood

The high degree of decentralization of power in Russia and the still higher level of anarchy make it a highly complex matter for the central government to supervise compliance with international agreements, but this does not absolve Moscow of responsibility for the actions of Russian enterprises and officials.

In the past the winged words of Romanov, former first secretary of Leningrad Oblast Party Committee, went all over America. In conversation with a group of U.S. senators who were discussing problems of ratifying the SALT II Treaty, Romanov said: "Never mind, the President will speak and you will vote like dears."

The senators were staggered but how was Romanov, who had been raised on experience of the splendidly trained USSR Supreme Soviet, to know that the legislators sometimes vote not only against the President but even to spite him?

There is more than enough such experience in Russia today, and so the Kremlin ought to be understanding of the Clinton administration's difficulties, which are natural for any democracy.

Opponents of the two countries' cooperation in space are basically not all that wrong. For all its mutually advantageous nature, the concluded deal is founded not only on commerce. Its advantages to Russia are also accounted for by political reasons, by the U.S. side's purposeful desire not to abuse Moscow's difficult economic position.

Although such an approach, as the U.S. leaders have emphasized, fully accords with the U.S. national interests in the long term, it is in need of strong protection. The inertia of the "Cold War" is still great and, multiplied by the interests of powerful corporations, it could affect the positions of the White House.

Under these conditions even a single flight by a commercial aircraft to Damascus can create difficulties for the supporters of Russian-U.S. space cooperation who are concentrated today in the administration. By avoiding a public discussion of that episode and ducking a tough qualification of it, Moscow provokes the questions formulated in THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.

Referring to the fact that the United States made contact with the authorities in Moscow "at least 48 hours before delivery," the newspaper asks: "Did Mr. Yeltsin try to stop delivery? Maybe he was too late? Or was he rebuffed? If this is so, what has he done to punish the persons responsible for this?"

These alarming questions would not have been asked if the Kremlin had issued an exhaustive explanation in good time.

Gaydar Assumes Duties of Economy Minister

LD2209150093 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1427 GMT 22 Sep 93

[Text] Moscow, 22 Sep (ITAR-TASS)— Russian President Boris Yeltsin issued a decree today, placing the duties of the Russian minister of the economy on Yegor Gaydar, first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Russian president's press service has told ITAR-TASS.

Conference on Federation Council Held

PM2209133993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 21 Sep 93 First Edition p 1

[Aleksandr Linkov report under the "We Report the Details" rubric: "Federation Council Apparently Set Up. But What Is the Reality?"]

[Text] Saturday's television and radio news bulletins began in practice with one and the same piece of news: Boris Yeltsin has proposed early elections for the post of Russian president, and a Federation Council has been set up. There was just one mention of the claim from the president's press-secretary that just a few people had spoken against this organ. The regular repetition of these "top" news stories created the impression that the Council's birth had already occurred. There is just one small point—it is to be ratified officially in October.

So what actually went on in the Kremlin? Let's not start making wild guesses, but instead let's turn for information to somebody who participated in the conference held—Vladimir Shtygashev, chairman of the Republic of Khakasia Supreme Soviet. In a conversation with journalists he noted that the conference progressed at a good pace. After Boris Yeltsin's opening speech, roughly 10 people spoke. They included M. Nikolayev, president of Sakha (Yakutia), V. Stepanov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Karelia, A. Sobchak, mayor of St. Petersburg, and others. On the whole they expressed support for the idea of setting up a Federation Council. However, concern was also expressed that the same-day signing would bring about not appeasement within society, but quite the opposite reaction.

Here is another detail noted by V. Shtygashev. There were somewhere in the region of 165-170 people present in the hall. Of these, just 30-35 were ready to sign immediately. The others were restricted in their powers by Soviets and administration collegiums.

"In Khakasia," the Supreme Soviet chairman said, "a sitting of the republic Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers took place. On the whole the idea was supported. But the powers to sign the documents were not bestowed upon us. Until we take the documents away with us and discuss them collectively, there can be no talk of our approval."

The conference organizers were probably not expecting such a cautious approach. To all appearances, the gamble was on total success. How else can one explain the fact that the necessary lists for signatures had already been prepared, and that everything had been done as required? Obtaining the consent of the majority was all that was important. However, documents so vital to the work such as the statute on the Federation Council and the rules of operation were not distributed to conference participants for perusal. They still have to be elaborated and examined in October.

The question of early elections was also broached. The schedule for holding them was clearly expounded in A. Sobchak's speech—elections to the new parliament in spring 1994 and to soviets at all levels in the fall, with no presidential elections until spring 1995. This model was also supported by Boris Yeltsin. Meanwhile the conference participants were plainly asking themselves this question: Exactly who are the Russians going to elect next spring, and to which body—the parliament, the Supreme Soviet, the Constituent Assembly, or what? In a bid somehow to clarify the situation, it was decided that the Federation Council should come out with the legislative initiative, submitting the draft law on federal organs of power to the Russian Supreme Soviet.

Nor was the question of the socioeconomic situation in the country passed over. It was with alarm that mention was made of the accumulated and unresolved problems, particularly in finance and credit relations. Unless the latter improve in the coming months it was warned, there would be no need to elect anyone to any body next year. The country will disintegrate.

"The whole conference was too organized," V. Shtygashev said to round off the conversation. "That is our trouble—trying to solve a complex issue in haste."

Federation Council Meeting Viewed

PM2309092993 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 21 Sep 93 p 1

[Lyubov Tsukanova article: "First Steps Down a Thorny Path"]

[Text] The Federation Council, which has been spoken of recently in diverse tones at all levels of power, met in the Kremlin last Saturday. The "roundtable" of the Russian regions was practically full. The fear that too large a number of local leaders who disagree with various aspects of the new organ's draft would not come to the meeting was not borne out: The fear of ending up overboard of a ship with tremendous potential power overcame ideological and organizational differences. Another fear was borne out: The lack of unity with regard to a whole number of founding points prevented the signing of the Agreement on the Federation Council at the very first session, although, in the opinion of many participants, the majority of the representatives of the republics, oblasts, and krays who gathered in Moscow were ready to sign this document.

The statement signed by the participants in the first session nonetheless states that the Federation Council has been formed "with the voluntary consent of the chairmen of the soviets of people's deputies and the heads of executive power of the components of the Russian Federation." The main provision, over which, in fact, lances were broken at the preliminary stage, was confirmed: The Federation Council is a consultative-deliberative organ which "has no intention of trespassing on the constitutional prerogatives of any branch of federal power." The new organ sees the purpose of its existence to help to achieve stability in the country and to improve its economic position. The main tasks include drawing up the mechanism of the Federation Treaty and strengthening the Russian Federation's integrity.

In point of fact, however, the question of constituting the new organ remained open. Among the leaders of the components of the Federation there is a small group which aspires to the Federation Council's independence with regard to the federal organs of power and the president above all. Whereas, according to the draft statute on the Federation Council, the president is to be its chairman, the Supreme Soviet chairman and the Council of Ministers chairman are to be its cochairmen. The seat of the speaker of parliament was empty at Saturday's session. It cannot be ruled out that the "effect of the absence" of Ruslan Khasbulatov played not the least role in the only partial success of the first session: Such blatant ignoring of the president's initiative by the head of the legislature showed once again that the Supreme Soviet leadership has no need of intermediaries between the opposing branches of power, for it is sure that the system of soviets possesses sufficient potential to gain a "victory" in this struggle through its own efforts.

At the same time the eloquent absence of the Supreme Soviet chairman confirmed President Yeltsin's words that "institutions of the former epoch," which are continuing to operate in the new political situation, are coming into objective conflict with the new democratic institutions of power and that they are "simply doomed to confront each other."

At the very first session the president secured from the components of the Federation something on which probably no one had been reckoning, namely resolute support for the idea of early elections to the new supreme legislative organ. In exchange, it is true, for early presidential elections. This truly sensational part of the statement requires further, highly decisive and consistent steps: approval for the idea of a draft Constitutional Law of the transitional period and Law on Elections and their recommendation for adoption by the Congress of People's Deputies. Will it agree and, if it does agree, will the Federation Council have time to take all these steps before November, when the next Congress is scheduled? To judge from the beginning, the path will not be smooth.

Ryabov-Led Constitution Working Group Adopts Decision

PM2209134193 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 16 Sep 93 p 1

["Own information" report: "Promising To Make President Equal"]

[Text] The last session of the Constitutional Commission working group under the leadership of N Ryabov ended yesterday. The session adopted a decision to instruct the Congress Constitutional Commission to set up a joint working group comprising people's deputies who are members of the Constitutional Commission, experts on the Constitutional Commission, representatives of the Russian Federation president, and representatives of Federation components (Russian Federation republics, krays, oblasts, and okrugs).

As People's Deputy Ivan Fedoseyev, member of the working group, put it, the proposal from presidential spokesman Mikhail Mityukov to instruct the working group set up by a directive from Yeltsin to draw up a draft constitution, was rejected. It was recommended that a joint working group be set up to prepare an agreed draft of the Russian Federation constitution on the basis of two drafts—from the president's Constitutional Conference and from the Constitutional Commission.

Ivan Fedoseyev stated that the group should draw up a draft constitution taking account of all the comments and proposals that have been received from the republics, krays, oblasts, and okrugs of Russia, and from Russian Federation Supreme Soviet committees and commissions.

Lobov Security Council Appointment Viewed

PM2209153593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 21 Sep 93 p 1

[Dmitriy Lvov article: "Lobov on the Security Council"]

[Text] Oleg Lobov's attack aimed at "renewing" the course of reforms failed. The "Program of Urgent Measures" drawn up under Lobov's leadership proposed a sharp increase in state interference in the economy, control over prices, and the issuing of cheap credits. The president's directive, which was prepared on his initiative, made fundamental changes to the privatization process, although it was later suspended. Lobov was also the ideologue of the statute on the Ministry of the Economy, under which this ministry essentially became a new State Planning Committee, crushing the other central economic organs on the pretext of "coordinating" their activity and acquiring the right to exercise complete sway in distributing state investments and centralized credits.

In the post of first vice premier Oleg Lobov failed to realize all these "initiatives," which might have had profound consequences. It can be assumed that he will be no less active in his new post as secretary of the Security

Council. It is clear that Lobov, like Shaposhnikov, dislikes a purely technical or decorative role and the lack of a clear-cut, legislatively formulated status for the very structure of the Security Council and the post of its secretary. Lobov failed to make a superministry out of the Ministry of the Economy, but maybe he will succeed in creating a similar powerful structure in the security sphere by strengthening the Security Council's coordinating role in the activities of the "power" ministries. The consequences of creating a "supermonster" in this delicate sphere are no less but, maybe, even more serious than in the economic sphere.

But it has to be said that attempts to increase the Security Council's influence over the power structures and to "coordinate" them will also encounter resistance. Pavel Grachev now undoubtedly plays "first fiddle" in the ensemble of "power" ministries. He will hardly forgo his influence and independence. Nikolay Golushko, who has just been appointed minister of security, will not yet be able to play a weighty political role. His appointment is also significant. Of all the candidacies a politically neutral professional has been chosen, who has great experience of work in the special services (he previously headed the Ukrainian KGB). This is also an indicator of the evolution of the Russian leadership's cadre policy, which has traveled the path from nominating "political commissars" for key posts to appointing experienced professionals.

Of course, Oleg Lobov cannot be called a specialist in specific security issues. But lack of knowledge of the specifics is not an obstacle. This has been shown by Yuriy Skokov, who in the post of Security Council secretary was able to become an independent influential figure. It is also an important fact that, unlike Shaposhnikov, who did not have direct access to the president and was not even able to be received by him, Oleg Lobov might not have such problems. As is known, he comes from the closest entourage of Boris Yeltsin, who is linked with him by many years of joint work.

This will lend special weight to Oleg Lobov's initiatives which might follow in his new post.

Chernomyrdin, Vice Premiers' Activities Reported

PM2209172193 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 21 Sep 93 p 1

[Unattributed feature: "Executive Branch Monitoring"]

[Excerpts] **Meetings, Conferences, Sessions**

Russian Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin has held a conference with his deputies. A wide range of questions was discussed, particularly the results of the Russian head of government's trip to Bryansk, the changes in the Cabinet of Ministers, and economic questions. [passage omitted]

In the morning Vice Premier Anatoliy Chubays, as well as his colleagues, participated in a conference with the head of government and then tackled current affairs.

During the day Vice Premier Boris Fedorov held a conference devoted to questions of the budget line.

In the afternoon Vice Premier Aleksandr Zaveryukha conducted a session of the Food Commission. The food situation which has taken shape during the present period and in the fourth quarter of this year was discussed.

Vice Premier Aleksandr Shokhin participated in a conference on the European Energy Charter and then, in the evening, he met with Wang Jinqing, PRC ambassador to the Russian Federation. [passage omitted]

Regions

Tatarstan's state management apparatus is being reduced by 10-20 percent. This is stated in an edict by Mintimer Shaymiyev, president of the republic. The reduction of staffs and of the wages fund will affect all components of the management of cities and rayons and will come into force 1 December. The document states that this is being done to eliminate apparatus overstaffing and to abolish structures which operate in parallel. [passage omitted]

Coup Plotters' Lawyer Attacked, Sustains Injuries

LD2209180693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0918 GMT 22 Sep 93

[By CRIME-PRESS correspondent Nikolay Semenenko]

[Text] Moscow September 22 TASS—Nikolay Pechenkin, defence lawyer of defendant Dmitriy Yazov, was absent from today's coup trial court session.

The lawyer was attacked on Tuesday [21 September] and sustained bodily injuries. Criminal proceedings have been instituted in this connection. The circumstances of the incident are being ascertained, the court secretary said.

In view of Pechenkin's failure to appear in court, as well as a request from defendant Vasiliy Starodubtsev to allow him to be present at civil funeral rites for the late Viktor Nikonov, former member of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, a further examination of the coup plotters' case was postponed until September 23.

Aide Maley Explains Reasons for Resignation

PM2209163193 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Sep 93 pp 1, 3

[Interview with former presidential adviser Mikhail Maley by Igor Chernyak in the Kremlin on 10 September under the "Furors" rubric; place and date of interview not given: "I Could Still Smash Windows in the Kremlin"]

[Text] Mikhail Maley is one of the veterans of the Yeltsin team. He entered government in 1989, when from a modest position as director of an All-Union Scientific Research Institute he was elected a Russian Federation

people's deputy, a member of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, chairman of one of the subcommissions, and soon afterwards deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers—chairman of the RSFSR State Committee for the Management of State Property. Since then Maley has been "one of the team" in all the governments that have been and gone—Silayev's, Gaydar's, and the present one. In 1992 he was elected a full member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences. His most recent job was adviser to the Russian Federation president on conversion issues.

There have never been any complaints about him, and the adviser's name has not been picked apart either by the left- or the right-wing press. By his own admission, he would have kept his job even if Zyuganov had come to power. His announcement that he is to resign is therefore all the more surprising.

[Maley] If you like, this is the ultimate way in which I can bring pressure to bear on those around me. I could also, of course, go off to the Kremlin and smash windows.

[Chernyak] Are you really that upset that the president has not met with you for three months?

[Maley] If only it were just me. Sergey Filatov has told me that he is only seeing three people. I don't want to be adviser to a man who I only see on the television, my advice to whom is dissected by countless aides—I am not an adviser to aides. I am sorry, but I am not just anybody, I am an academician, I can do a thing or two with my brain and hands, and do I have to try to argue to some Ryurikov that the president should receive the Indian defense minister, because there are hundreds of millions of dollars and 170,000 jobs in our country at stake in a possible deal? But I got the following reply: "Mikhail Dmitrich, perhaps you are a specialist in Indian affairs?" I answered that I am a dog fancier, I know a thing or two about dogs, when to hit them and when not to. Since then I have been out of favor. Shaposhnikov said recently in the newspapers that he could not even talk with the president over the telephone, but he is a new boy, not an official, just a naive marshal from our Russian-Soviet military whereas I am an experienced apparatchik....

When I spoke with Filatov, I said that I could not cover the entire military-industrial complex on my own, but nobody is interested in this sphere anymore—the premier does not understand it at all; Oleg Soskovets came along, he could have understood it, but he is busy with the metallurgical industry and other things, he is not really interested. Shokhin hails from a completely different field, although, to be frank, he has astonished me—first, he is genuinely interested, and second, Sasha has learned very fast—all these people from Gaydar's team have significantly added to their knowledge since they came to power, but even this is a problem because Shokhin is involved in other areas and is thus basically debarred from addressing the main issues. Then there was Khizha. Georgiy Stepanovich is a good man, but he was too out of touch with the Moscow political trough; he sat around for a year and did not know any of the politicians, either on the left or the right wing. Shokhin has changed over the year; toward the end Gaydar became one of the most intelligent politicians, leaders, and economists. Admittedly he was driven out once he had learned how to do the job. Khizha, however, could not learn.

On the whole, I think, I will be difficult to replace. Not because I am so intelligent. If you talk with academicians, you will see that they do not send anyone from their own background into this sphere, they do not let anyone climb the ladder. What if we install a great democrat such as Volkov (Filatov's deputy—I. Ch.)? They speak a different language, they simply do not understand one another. And then, my desk can be filled, I'm vacating it, but this desk represents the extent to which the military-industrial complex is accessible to the president.

Although, of course, Viktor Glukhikh (chairman of the State Committee for the Defense Sectors of Industry—I.Ch.) will stay on alone—things will be quite bad for him. I have almost had my sleeves ripped off owing to the political infighting; I am summoned to both the White House and the Kremlin and instructed to tell the other side in no uncertain terms that they are idiots. Glukhikh will not be able to deal with the situation on his own. The minister for the nuclear industry is a very worthy and intelligent guy, but he is an academician and scientific director of the Arzamas nuclear center. With all due respect to him, he is not combative by nature. He is not standing in the firing line or grabbing anyone by the throat, although he could do so. It turns out that both the atomic and defense complexes are basically mismanaged at the present time, and instead of earning foreign currency they are obliged to beg money. And whereas my tenure here was previously thought by my colleagues to be indecent, it is now regarded as criminal.

[Chernyak] You wrote your statement requesting permission to resign on 20 July, and since then your decision has remained unchanged. What was the reason for your resignation?

[Maley] Primarily the situation that is developing in the country and its defense complex.

[Chernyak] I quote from M. Maley's speech to the conference of directors of military-industrial complex enterprises in Nizhniy Novgorod on 9 September: "I am by nature an optimist, but at the present time I am very worried. A critical moment in the country's history has arrived—the military-industrial complex is in flux, the skeleton that hitherto has held everything up in Russia has started to shift. That is the last thing we have left... If you travel across the country you will be amazed: Plants are empty, there is a power vacuum in Moscow, there is no government, the country is ungovernable. The situation could get out of control, and we will be unable to keep on top of it... We need to tell Shokhin and the

others that we cannot listen to any more empty promises. Today we can ask for more tomorrow we must make demands, and the day after that we must take matters into our own hands."

[Maley] Look at a session of the Council of Ministers—it is the worst example of an old-style system in which six people sit around a table and behind them are about 50 backbenchers—ministers and other people whose opinions nobody asks for. Nobody votes for them, they only learn of the agenda en route to the session, and they make rubber-stamp decisions: There are no objections. This sort of thing used to happen under Ryzhkov, then Silayev tried to do it but was prevented. And now Chernomyrdin has done the same thing.

The latest Council of Ministers session (our interview took place 10 September—I.Ch.) which was held here in the Kremlin sent me a very clear signal. It was attended by heads of administrations and chairmen of republic Councils of Ministers and, while they sat around in silence and nobody apart from Shaymiyev spoke, it became apparent that no republic would implement on its territory anything that Yeltsin, Chernomyrdin, or Lobov said.

[Chernyak] You mean that, in your view, we are in a state of total paralysis?

[Maley] That is precisely what it is. I have worked in a Union ministry, I have been a deputy chairman myself, and in any state, even a banana republic, I would not tolerate a situation in which an immediate directive from the prime minister which is supposed to be implemented in a day takes a month to implement, and nobody chases it up.

[Chernyak] What directive is this?

[Maley] For about five months Breusov (chairman of the trade union of Russian Federation defense industry enterprises—I.Ch.) and Shulunov (chairman of the League for Assisting Russian Federation Defense Enterprises—I.Ch.) had tried to secure an audience with the president or the premier. I wrote the president a note requesting that he receive them together with Viktor Glukhikh before the start of strike conferences so that directors could then be told that the president had at least found time to meet with them. He did not find the time. They eventually got to see Chernomyrdin 2 August. Viktor Stepanovich listened to them very sympathetically and wrote an exceedingly menacing resolution: Top priority! We have a slip of red paper that clips onto another piece of paper and signifies that all other business must be pushed aside and only the said piece of paper is to be dealt with. The directive instructed that 200 billion rubles were to be disbursed within a day as defense enterprise wages. Since then a month has passed and we haven't seen a dime! From this it follows either that our premier is a sham, if **this** is how his directive is implemented, or that our premier is a shyster since his directive was in fact circulated without a "top priority" marker, but when money has to be paid out to the gas industry, the operation is completed in 24 hours. This episode sent me a signal. Well, I am going to get out now before I have to share responsibility for what will happen.

[Chernyak] Where is your note to the president now?

[Maley] With Burbulis.

[Chernyak] But what has it got to do with Burbulis?

[Maley] And what has he got to do with Japan? You might be forgiven for thinking that his apartment borders directly onto these islands. On the whole I think the apparatus made a big mistake regarding Burbulis: He should not have been dropped, we have only had trouble since. For all his unpleasant external traits he has one important characteristic: He is able to assess the consequences of decisions that have been made, he is inclined to analyze. When he was elbowed aside, we lost an intelligent man—that was all. Now the policymakers who have arrived in the Kremlin are people like the former chief of a technical control department from Murmansk. I assess my capabilities in a sober fashion, and I would not like to be the president of Russia, especially as the longer I sit here, the more I realize that I lack the intelligence, experience, and knowledge even to be premier. Chernomyrdin is a fine guy—apart from drilling holes, he's never done anything else, and now he has taken charge of a country like Russia without so much as blinking.

Let me digress. There is another reason for my resignation—the president's decision on the Security Council. After all, the Security Council was conceived as a superstructural state organ in which the most important decisions for the country could be examined and adopted. Now, frightened of Skokov, the president has personally erased the Security Council from the future Constitution. What remains—the administration? The budget makes no provision for its upkeep, and if the deputies get their hands on it they will make short work of closing it down. Besides, with all respect to Sergey Filatov, it is after all just a chancellery and not a state organ.

The idea of a commission for the military-industrial complex, a kind of scientific and technical council under the Security Council, has consequently died a death as well. The idea was that it should not be Andrey Kokoshin or someone else who decided which military products would be manufactured, but instead the decision should be made by a gathering of specialists who would argue and disagree with one another entirely, but the end result would be an objective core list of things on which money could be spent, but in contrast to the former USSR, we have very little money at our disposal. The chief directors, designers, and scientists I talked with were "for" the idea—it is currently the only way they can make their voice heard. Osipov (president of the Russian Academy of Sciences—I.Ch.) came to see me, saying that we don't know who to go and see. Here's a paradox: The president of the Russian Academy of Sciences has been

unable to see the Russian president for months! No, Pasha Grachev wrote a categorical objection which, of course, was drawn up by Kokoshin and the generals, saying that yet another bureaucratic organ will be created. Under the system established before, 150 extremely skilled officials dealt with these matters, obtaining all the information they wanted and making the decisions. Now they have thrown the baby out with the bath water. The generals are obviously unwilling to go along with this idea: They will be obliged to count every kopek and report back on who they gave the money to and why. Whereas now, having got hold of the piggy bank, they can give away 20 billion to some supernumerary design bureau to design an item that will never have any prospects. I respect the generals very much, they include a number of worthy people, but unfortunately the best brains of Russia are not among them.

One other point—the comedy involving Viktor Glukhikh. He has eight former USSR defense ministries under his jurisdiction, formally speaking he is deemed a minister, but he is not given a copy of the government's work schedule or a list of the topics the government is dealing with. I receive them, and then I send him a copy like a crumb from the master's table. Not only is this situation humiliating for him, but in addition whenever he opens his mouth he is told that he is a military-industrial complex bureaucrat, and the received opinion is that he must either be talking rubbish or indulging in antireformist propaganda, but I have seen turbines he has designed in Uruguay, I have seen how respectfully he was treated. I called Chubays recently and said: Give the guy a break; operatives of yours like Mostovoy (deputy chairman of the State Committee for the Management of State Property—I.Ch.) only know how to cut bread; they don't even know what sort of grain it's made from, don't saw through the branch you're sitting on.

[Chernyak] Why then, in your view, do the Russian authorities currently have this attitude to the military-industrial complex?

[Maley] You know, I had my own distinctive and sober attitude to the Gaydar team, and I think the president acted correctly when we were... The two Silayev governments, myself included, had done their job. It is a long story how we dealt with union property and how I reregisterd ships to different ports. It was a difficult and enormous task, but we completed it. However, the Silayev government was incapable of undertaking any reforms. Therefore what the president did was correct, although it did offend a number of people. I myself felt insulted for about six weeks. But a dialectic requires logic. I carried out my function in the Gaydar government. Once it had shut its eyes, it was able to forge ahead according to plan. They didn't know anything, and hence they were not afraid to go forward. Nobody would have done this—but they did.

But both the former and the latter governments had one false premise: The military-industrial complex is opposed to reforms. They did not realize that this idea of the military-industrial complex does not and never did ring true. Everything was always decided here on Staraya Ploshchad. A Central Committee agent used to summon the defense minister, the latter would put all other business aside, go to the agent's office, and wait quietly in line in the corridor. This unknown agent could have the minister from the military-industrial complex removed, whereas the converse was never true.

So it was that both these governments frightened Boris Nikolayevich into thinking that the military-industrial complex is the opposition, a power base of communist cells and aspirations. There weren't any. Yes, there were fanatical people, there still are today, but there are plenty of them around Yeltsin, awful people incapable of anything and conservative by nature—what of it? They should have been dropped peacefully, as Kirsan Ilyumzhinov [president of Kalmykia] did by paying them off—and everyone was happy, the former Council of Ministers chairman now sings this president's praises and describes him as a star performer. The military-industrial complex has been made out to be a bogeyman, and people have formed the impression that the 5 million people it employs—6 million including the nuclear industry or, taking their families into account, 18 million if we multiply by three—have ripped Russia off. Let me assure you that the metallurgical complex consumes more.

Moreover, Skokov has spoiled things slightly. I respect him, although we are very different people, we have known each other a long time and have worked in the same ministry. The thing is that he very much likes to have his little secrets. As a result the Security Council set up what amounted to a clandestine oblast committee, frightened Boris Nikolayevich and his entourage almost to death, and now nobody believes me at all, thinking that I am just some sort of camouflage for the menacing might of the military-industrial complex, whereas at the same time Skokov wanted to topple his own president with my help.

When I talked with Yeltsin in April, I said to him: You will win the referendum, Boris Nikolayevich, and moreover we will help you win it; this will be the best indication of the attitude of the military-industrial complex to yourself. And in fact he lost the whole of rural Russia, but won in the big cities. Which means us. Take Moscow—1 million of our people voted for him, or Udmurtia, where he also won—86 percent; it was the same story in Nizhniy Novgorod and Tula. But I did not convince him.

[Chernyak] But I thought you had found some sort of mutual understanding thus far...

[Maley] We at least wanted to bring some information to the president's attention. For example, the defense complex comprises 967 scientific research institutes and design bureaus, many of these, for example the Central Aerohydrodynamics Institute, constitute entire cities. In

these places the process of disintegration is proceeding apace. We have indicated that it will not be possible to save all 967, but in Russia's specific conditions we cannot lower ourselves to preserving a mere 14-16 main institutes where life will continue to be all wine and roses. Consequently we have specified 72 enterprises which we will continue to support and where we will help to preserve the intellectual elite by establishing a sort of island where brains will congregate. Painful or not, we were obliged to put ourselves in the position of a surgeon who is amputating a leg but saving the patient. And this is the decision the president made.

A whole series of trips around the country by Boris Nikolayevich was organized. This was extremely useful for him because, as a Politburo member and secretary of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Party Committee, Boris Nikolayevich had no idea what kind of state he was governing. He doesn't know much about what we already have and what we do not need to build because it has been built already, that we have airfields buried under a meter of earth where oats are growing, airfields that can be turned into strategic installations within two days. We have caves as big as multistory buildings, where, for example, we could site underground nuclear stations straightaway without spending anything. There is a great deal the president does not know.

Thus when he went to Arzamas-16, I was very pleased. Without any hysterics, and showing due respect to the president, the engineers and scientists nevertheless told him the whole truth right to his face. And he reacted in the right way. Things were in quite a state there—a shiver would go down your spine as you walked past a concrete storage facility containing 260 megatonnes and you noticed that people had started stealing the barbed wire from the facility's outer perimeter fence—someone had carefully wound it up and run off with it: There was nowhere else to go. Wages there were so laughable that even our janitors in the Kremlin earn 50 percent more.

The president saw everything—he signed an edict and established two federal nuclear centers in Russia: Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk. Under this edict, housing construction in these cities was to have been resumed, wages were to have been increased, and funds were to have been found for scientific activity. What do you think happened? I subsequently spoke with center director Belugin, who expressed his feelings in fairly colorful language. He, an academician, was obliged to make the rounds of officials and beg for this money. Energy suppliers were threatening to cut off supplies of everything they could because he owed them 500 billion for electricity. He explained that he had a reactor which could under no circumstances be shut down, and he was told: That's your problem. They will put me in jail, Mikhail Dmitriyevich, he said, and I promised him that we would go to jail together. In addition to this, there is nothing to pay people with—whizzing along in a ZIL limousine or sitting in the Ministry of Finance, it's agreeable to ponder how much people can endure. So instead of offering to help him, the administration dispatched Ilyushenko's supervisory administration commission. It returned a month later without finding anything. Recently the Ministry of Finance, apparently running scared, transferred 2.2 billion rubles. But where has the money for the nuclear center got to? If we bear in mind the annual interest rate—280 percent—then someone is making a very large amount of money. Who? If this is not abuse of some kind, then it must be professional incompetence.

I was able to get things moving in another sphere—the president was taken to Plesetsk. You should have seen his astonishment when he learned that 87 percent of all USSR launches were carried out here and not at Baykonur. Then he visited the Sevmash enterprise. When Boris Nikolayevich had had a look at all this, he made the following remark: "If someone had told me that this could happen I would not have believed it, and in Russia never." Recently I made a trip there with Chernomyrdin—no irreversible damage had basically occurred. Which is no thanks to the government, but despite it, and this has admittedly been achieved with the very active involvement of Glukhikh and his deputies. After all, unlike the scientific center, this is a plant and the suppliers are doing their job, they are not afraid to stoop to bribery if necessary, etc.

But here the presidential initiative of going on trips came to a standstill. On the third occasion we were supposed to escort him to Kaliningrad where we wanted to set up a federal rocket center and thus create another refuge. We did not succeed. Instead a whole department of rocket scientists was taken off an aircraft bound for North Korea.

Thus Boris Nikolayevich won the referendum and was terribly pleased about it. But this new expression of confidence in him proved short-lived, and instead of capitalizing on it, the president's men have veered off into a confrontation with parliament. I said to Sergey Filatov, whom I respect a great deal because he too is from a scientific background: Instead of spectacles you' have a portrait of Khasbulatov in front of your eyes, you can't see anything else, but Russia has already moved on—beyond both Khasbulatov and the president. Russia is sliding toward the worst-case scenario—the Gorbachev option. Thank-you Mikhail Sergeyevich, at least we know now what the end result will be.

[Chernyak] Yes, I wouldn't classify you as the optimistic type...

[Maley] No, I am the greatest optimist in the entire team, but right now, I am afraid, a reckless period is beginning, and for the first time I am frightened. If Yeltsin's regime continues to drive its opponents into a corner, unpredictable consequences could ensue. Once upon a time Yeltsin took the right step—he did not send Gorbachev to jail, even though he very much wanted to. We cannot expect Yeltsin to go to jail, presumably. Every regime that resorts to repressive measures perishes by these measures: Its successor, which tightens these measures

up, attributes them primarily to representatives of the former regime. The Jacobins invented the guillotine and put their own heads on the block—history contains all the examples you could hope to find.

I witnessed how Gaydar's men threw all deputy chairman Kamenev's personal effects out of his office. I was in a lift with Shokhin, and I joked: "Sasha, they'll throw you out of the window." God grant that my prophecy will not come true. It will be the greatest misfortune for Russia if men with flashing eyes like Anpilov or Misha Chelokov come to power, men who do not know the first thing about anything and who cannot control what they say or do, but the tragedy is not yet upon us, we still have another two or three months to wait.

I once wrote to the president: 1992 was a brilliant year in the history of the reforms, provided that 1993 sees the foundation of a new economic system in Russia constructed on the fragments of 1992. Otherwise 1993 will be criminal and senseless. That is what is happening, and nobody seems to know what must be done. The president too—he started out on his long journey in a battered Moskvich, changed into three ZIL limousines, walled himself away in dachas, and acquired an entourage. Even after cuts, his apparatus has grown by 180 percent compared to the entire Soviet apparatus. People are teeming like cockroaches—we have occupied the Kremlin, the Arbat, all of Staraya Ploshchad, and the White House; people have multiplied in fearful proportions. In the Soviet era there was a pivot—the party apparatus was in place, and alongside this there was party and state control, the KGB, and all the rest. Our apparatus has became so large, however, that it cannot bear its own weight and has disintegrated. It cannot be held up, it is not self-supporting. Therefore if a new government comes to power, we will need to undertake some extremely painful surgery: The incompetent people who have come in the place of competent people need to be removed, we need to cut the apparatus by one-third. Although I'm not sure that anyone can do this.

[Chernyak] You've painted a depressing picture.

[Maley] The picture is not depressing. We did not experience a nuclear war. Nobody has stolen our technology (our superconductivity secrets are worth $6 billion alone). All our people here are prepared to work on their days off. They are even better prepared for this following the Gaydar shock, once they realized that nobody needs them and nobody will take care of them. But now if you pat them on the head, say thank-you, and give them an official document, they will move mountains just as in wartime. We are in an extremely advantageous starting position. But we are not doing anything—that is the depressing thing.

It was a very big success for me when Christopher and Kozyrev said in Washington that everyone is selling and has sold weapons, and Russia should also have a place in the market. I called Andrey at the time and said: "Thanks a lot for saying at the end of 1992 something for which you roundly denounced me to the president when I said the same thing a year earlier." Recently we talked with pro-Westerners: If they hold us back for much longer, we will start trading with Libya, Iraq, and Iran. We cannot let people starve to death merely because the Americans are sticking to a particular line while they go ahead and sell everything indiscriminately, wherever they can, as soon as the deal is worth anything over $3; they sell everything and neither the greens, the Greenpeace people, nor anyone else gets in the way. This is a purely rational thing. And it is time for us to ditch our illusions.

Our calculations show that the time is ripe for establishing a CIS military-industrial union, since no republic except Russia can establish a military industry in isolation. Right now we are selling off surpluses of tanks, barrels, screws, and tracks—but what then? Here is a file lying on my desk—answers from the republics: basically they are prepared to go along with the idea. Antonov, the Ukrainian minister for the military-industrial complex, came to see me, he told me that some deputies had come to see him, very pleased with themselves, saying: Shove it, Russkies, we're making the Zenit missile, it's got a great future, let's trade it, Mr. Minister. He said: I listened and listened, and then I said OK, let's start tomorrow. Just give me 300 billion rubles to set up a propellant industry—there are no propellant plants in Ukraine. So now we either have to focus all our energies on developing Zenit in our country, or they will have to establish a propellant industry. While we are doing this, the rest of the world will be way ahead and we will be left behind in the gutter. The defense industry card has now been played. We must not miss our chance: If we divide up the military-industrial complex once and for all, we will introduce an extremely powerful divisive factor. At the present time, however, instead of an instrument of unification, a starting platform for drawing together Ukrainians, Belarusians, and others who are unable to go it alone—no offense meant, but they have acknowledged their impotence—we are allowing these strike conferences to go ahead.

The regime has completely exhausted itself. This government is useless, it has served its function. It absolutely has to be replaced, and at the same time we need a change of ideology, we need pragmatism. The Communists have not been shot, and consequently the president must also act as their president. If we do not dismiss directors we dislike, it means we must work alongside them. Moreover, we must stop kowtowing to outsiders and waiting for money we have been promised, because this money does not exist. The only solution is therefore elections—for both government and president. If Yeltsin hangs on, however, he will need to thoroughly wash his underwear, because right now he hass been covered in dirt—you cannot even see his face. I have served him—and the post of adviser presupposes this sort of work—because I believed that he did not wish Russia any harm. But the road to hell is paved with good intentions. You

need some ability as well. No offense to Boris Nikolayevich, he has done a great job, and I don't think the country will forget him. But right now we need another approach: Without improvisations or blind faith in Chubays, who is molding collectivization in its pure form. I think this approach will come.

Private Trade Sells More Goods Than State Trade

PM2209170593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Sep 93 First Edition p 2

[Rustam Arifdzhanov report: "People Buy More from Private Traders and Cooperatives than from State Stores. For First Time We Have Given State Traders Less Money than Private Traders"]

[Text] Just a year ago the noise of the cash register signaled the closing of a deal in which I—who had been sent by my wife to buy sausage and food made by the Proctor and Gamble company—and the state participated. Three fourths of expenditure on purchases made by all families in the country went into the coffers of state commerce. Today state commerce receives only 46 percent from us, the remainder goes into the pockets of private traders, who receive 40 percent, and consumer cooperatives, which receive approximately 14 percent.

To be fair, we should mention that the routes of our shopping trips around the city have not changed greatly. For example, on my fact-finding tour I came across the same sights but with changed names and owners—the "Magazin 88" and "Peterburg" limited partnerships, the "GUM" joint-stock company, and "Detskiy Mir"... The share of our expenditure taken by genuinely private traders has risen a little more than one and a half times. But on the other hand we have begun to buy 12 times more quality goods of various types at limited partnerships and joint-stock companies—the former state stores which, when all is said and done, are now private.

In terms of the rate at which privatization is taking place, retail trade is the clear leader in our economy. Of half a million retail trade and public catering enterprises spread between Kaliningrad and the Kuril Archipelago, fewer than 40,000 stores, kiosks, cafes, and eateries belong to private individuals. This only amounts to 8 percent, but so what? This 8 percent sells as much as the whole state sector, and more if you take into consideration consumer cooperative outlets. What is more, the private outlets' profitability is one and a half times greater today than that of state outlets, and from the point of view of profitability of spending (that is the relation of profit to distribution costs) is two times greater.

We must once more be fair. There is no doubt that the good results of the private trading enterprises' activities are linked with pricing, as the level of prices in private stores and cafes is at least one and a half times higher than in state ones, but it is not only prices which are the reason for the private trader's prosperity.

The private trader is a more active businessman than the trade official. For example, almost 40 percent of goods come to private stores under long-term contracts with manufacturing enterprises, whereas only 31 percent comes to city stores by this route. As concerns one-off deals, which demand significant entrepreneurial efforts on the part of the store when they are struck, the indicators are 13 and 3 percent respectively. Apart from this, private traders are good at geography as half of their goods come from different regions, whereas the state store workers are not so good at it as less than a fourth of what they sell is brought in from afar.

Efficient Drilling Rig Developed at Military Plant

PM2209131993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Sep 93 First Edition p 15

[Boris Konovalov report: "Defense Industry Workers Arm Geologists by Creating a Unique Drilling Rig"]

[Text] The "Vympel" State Machine-Building Design Bureau, which specialized in aviation and antiaircraft arms, has created an original modern drilling rig.

Until now we have produced drilling rigs at the standard of the thirties—cumbersome, energy-intensive, and inefficient. In these rigs the whole column of pipes rotates, becoming increasingly heavy as it goes deeper. Now the first drilling rig in which only the shaft with the bit at the end rotates, while the column of pipes is simply lowered slowly down as it goes deeper, has appeared in Russia. This has simplified the design and almost halved the weight.

The Ministry of Geology spent 20 years trying to find a developer of such a drilling rig—now conversion has helped. The pumps, motors, and hydraulics in the new drilling rig have been taken from defense technology and improved. An original adjustable hydraulic drive has been created. A sensor constantly determines the ground's resistance, and if the rock is "pliant," the operator increases the drilling speed, and decreases it if it is hard.

The drilling rig which has been developed and is now undergoing field trials makes it possible to drill prospecting wells to a depth of 1 km, with the pipes' diameter ranging between 43 and 70 mm. It can be adopted by all geological prospecting parties conducting a search for solid minerals. The first 50 applications have already been received from geologists.

ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI Registers VEKHI Supplement

PM2309091193 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 18 Sep 93 p 1

[Editorial notice: "Attempt To Change VEKHI"—from VEKHI supplement]

[Text] We inform readers that from 15 September VEKHI, like ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI's other special publications, was officially registered as a supplement to our

newspaper at the Russian Federation Ministry of the Press and Information. The editorial office was forced to take this step in response to attempts to encroach on its intellectual property. The first attempt was made by representatives of a number of public cultural organizations who are associated with our newspaper, by registering the name of VEKHI. But then, realizing the mistake and recognizing ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI's rights to its own supplement, they dropped it and offered their apologies to the editorial office.

Passions had only just died down when VEKHI was subjected to another attack. The editorial office has learned that this time an attempt to make VEKHI an independent government newspaper was made secretly, unbeknown to the collective. The initiators of this action found a powerful patron in the person of Sergey Stankevich, adviser to the Russian Federation president. They also used the authority and prestige of a number of eminent cultural figures for their own ends.

Of course, the appearance of a new publication can only be welcomed. But a newspaper declaring its service to lofty moral ideals can hardly begin from immoral steps, from the piratical encroachment on our editorial collective's intellectual property. The need for yet another government publication paid for out of taxpayers' pockets is also questionable. Of course, this decision could be adopted, but ultimately it is not the authorities but the readers who decide the fate of any new publication. We too are fully aware of our debt to our readers. Instead of widening VEKHI's intellectual field and increasing its influence on the whole gamut of mutual relations between the government and intelligentsia, we are having to waste considerable effort repelling attacks on our intellectual property. This struggle is also affecting VEKHI's quality and even its frequency of publication, which, as you can see, has changed of late. We hope that there will be no more such interruptions in the publication of our supplement, which has already received recognition, and that there will be no intrigues over it either.

International Affairs

Kravchuk Appeals to UN To Stop Bloodshed in Georgia

LD2209230693 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 22 Sep 93

[Text] Ukraine's President Leonid Kravchuk has sent a telegram to UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali in connection with the events in Georgia. It deals with the tragic situation in Georgia where the achieved agreements have again been violated and where people are dying. In his telegram Leonid Kravchuk says that he appealed to the president of the Russian Federation, which is a guarantor of a tripartite agreement on armistice, with the request to take every possible measure to stop the bloodshed. The president of Ukraine has appealed to the UN secretary general and to the UN member states to use every possibility to stop the escalation of the above conflict.

Leonid Kravchuk also appealed to all the political leaders who have at least the slightest influence on the developments in Georgia with the demand to stop the fratricidal war and prevent the flames of military actions from taking more human lives.

Defense Ministry Protests Black Sea Fleet 'Provocations'

WS2309110593 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network in Ukrainian 0500 GMT 23 Sep 93

["Text" of a declaration issued by the Defense Ministry Press Service; place and date issued not given]

[Text] Some media disseminated a declaration by the Black Sea Fleet Press Center on an incident between a Ukrainian marine unit and coastal troops of the Black Sea Fleet. According to the Black Sea Fleet Press Center, the marines assaulted a tank regiment of the coastal troops, and on 18 September, attacked the regiment's checkpoint and beat three fleet servicemen with shovels. The statement emphasized that the fleet's command is ready to undertake corresponding measures to protect honor and dignity of Black Sea sailors and stabilize the situation in areas where Black Sea Fleet units are stationed, and demands that all provocations be stopped and all necessary measures be taken to prevent the situation in the Crimea from turning into a dangerous standoff. Hinting at the involvement of the Ukrainian Armed Forces General Staff in the aforementioned incidents, the Black Sea Fleet Command holds the Ukrainian Defense Ministry entirely responsible for all possible consequences.

The Ukrainian Defense Ministry Press Service is entitled to declare the following:

1. The Ukrainian Defense Ministry has always supported the civilized resolution of problems connected with the Black Sea Fleet and strict abidance by existing laws, and has never instigated subordinate troops to make provocations with far-reaching consequences. Due to the fact that the Black Sea Fleet is subordinated to the Ukrainian and Russian presidents and the majority of its bases are located on Ukrainian territory, it is natural that the Ukrainian Armed forces are interested in preserving peace (?with a neighboring state).

2. On 18 September of this year, a case of statute-violating relations was reported between Black Sea Fleet servicemen and [word indistinct] of Ukraine. Two marines who were delivering food to the field camp [words indistinct] were beaten by servicemen from the fleet's coast units. Another Ukrainian serviceman was beaten on that same day. The garrison's prosecutor office has initiated criminal proceedings connected with the incident.

3. Of late, Black Sea fleet servicemen have launched a range of hooligan attacks against Ukrainian servicemen. They demand that Ukrainian sailors abandon the Ukrainian state symbols and mock their service in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In this regard, the Ukrainian defense minister sent a letter on 11 September to the Black Sea Fleet commander expressing his hope that [words indistinct] official will find ways to influence the situation and will stick to the principles of lawfulness. Unfortunately, no reply from Admiral Baltin has been received as of now.

4. Fact-twisting in reporting about cases of statute-violating relations between Black Sea Fleet sailors and [words indistinct] hamper stabilization of the situation around the fleet. Attempts by the Black Sea Fleet Command to exert influence on the solution of this problem complicates relations between the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet and the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

5. The Ukrainian Defense Ministry is sending the Black Sea Fleet Command a proposal to jointly step up efforts to ensure order and discipline among the troops, exhibit restrain and sagacity when assessing the current events, and preserve self-control, decency, and discretion in the course of a further solution to the Black Sea Fleet issue.

Alleged Officers' Union Statement on Crimean Agreements

WS2209143693 Kiev KHRESHCHATYK in Ukrainian 16 Sep 93 p 2

[Statement by the Union of Officers of Ukraine attributed to Major General Oleksandr Skipalskiy, adopted on 11 September; place not given]

[Text] The signing of the protocols at the 3 September meeting between the Ukrainian and Russian presidents has shattered Ukrainian people's hopes that Russia will leave Ukraine alone and renounce its imperial claims, as well as that the Ukrainian leadership will become a guarantor of security and constitutional order in our state.

The signing of the protocol on reselling the Ukrainian Black Sea Fleet and its onshore facilities, as well as transferring Ukrainian nuclear weapons to Russia testifies to the capitulation of our state's leadership and its treason.

The Commander in Chief of Ukraine sacrificed to the Russians thousands of Ukrainian Navy officers, who took an oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people and, neglecting physical and moral abuse, strived for creation of the Ukrainian Navy.

The president is preparing to sign the so-called economic union, which once signed will transform Ukraine into a Russian protectorate and eventually a colony.

The Union of Officers of Ukraine [SOU] will not stand by when Ukrainian independence, its Armed Forces, and the fate of its oppressed people are at stake.

Assuming the above, the SOU demands that:

1. The Ukrainian Supreme Council be summoned and denounce the signed protocols of the Crimean agreement on either reselling or transferring the Ukrainian Black Sea Fleet and its onshore facilities to Russia.

2. The nuclear arms free state status of Ukraine be reconsidered and the reduction and dismantling of Ukrainian nuclear weaponry be carried out equally with other nuclear powers' rights.

3. The signing of any documents and creation of any unions that would threaten Ukrainian security, harm its sovereignty, or weaken its Armed Forces be prevented. Ukraine's leaving CIS be announced on the 24 September 1993 meeting of state leaders.

4. Negotiations with Russia on Russian Navy withdrawal from Ukrainian territorial waters and Russian Armed Forces withdrawal from Ukrainian shores of the Black Sea be conducted with the participation of international observers.

5. The head of the Security Service and the minister of internal affairs be ousted, since they are not able to secure interests of the Ukrainian state and curb illegal activities and mafia structures, and because they allow foreign states' chauvinistic forces to rage in Ukraine.

The SOU will support Colonel General Konstyantyn Morozov for his dignity, his loyalty to the state, and the firm patriotic principles he displayed during the signing of the protocols on reselling the Black Sea Fleet and transferring nuclear weaponry to Russia.

The SOU cannot allow anti-Ukrainian forces to drag our state into a new Russian empire, and reserves the right to call on the Armed Forces to defend our land and the constitutional order.

Adopted at the 11 September 1993 meeting of the SOU Executive Committee.

Party of Greens Denounces Crimean Agreements

WS2209135693 Kiev KHRESHCHATYK in Ukrainian 14 Sep 93 p 2

[Statement by the Party of Greens of Ukraine Political Council; place and date not given]

[Text] The Party of Greens of Ukraine Political Council considers the results of the 3 September Ukrainian-Russian negotiations in Crimea as yet another attempt by the Ukrainian leadership to compensate, by means of political and military concessions, its inability to withstand the superpower's blackmail, change the political system, and secure the national economy. All questions connected with the Ukrainian Navy's future should be resolved after the Black Sea Fleet is partitioned, after the terms and conditions of Russian vessels' temporary stationing in Ukrainian ports are set, and after the deadlines of their final withdrawal are agreed. A partition of onshore facilities is not acceptable under any condition.

Reselling of the Ukrainian part of the fleet to Russia will lead to a consolidation of Russian military presence on Ukrainian territory. Russian domination of the Black Sea will cause destabilization in the region and affect national security interests of other Black Sea region countries. A permanent threat to the environment will remain where the fleet is stationed and on the Black Sea. The Black Sea Fleet is one of the most dangerous sources of environment pollution in Ukraine and this issue became an international problem long ago.

The issue of Ukrainian debt to Russia must be resolved in connection with the honest partition of the USSR's assets and foreign property. Eventually, a parallel and gradual reduction of the Ukrainian and Russian fleets, in a framework of a Black Sea countries' demilitarization initiative, would be the best solution to the problems connected with the heritage of the USSR Navy. Yet the scale of Russia's geopolitical claims makes such an approach hardly possible.

A direct threat to Ukraine's national existence, generated by the negotiations, drives the last moderate supporters of President Kravchuk to the fierce opposition camp. The fatal steps made by the leaders of our state in the field of political and military relations with Russia deprive Ukraine of its historical perspectives.

Crimea Parliament Head for Economic Ties With Russia

MK2209104993 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Sep 93 p 3

[Text] On 21 September, the 19th session of the Sevastopol City Soviet opened. On the agenda is the question of the Sevastopol City Soviet's position on the instructions from the Ukrainian and Russian presidents concerning the Black Sea Fleet and the formation of an economic union of Commonwealth states. The deputy chairman of the Republic of Crimea's Supreme Soviet

and the Ukraine president's representative in Sevastopol, Ivan Yermakov, proposed that if Ukraine fails to sign the agreement on the creation of the economic union within the CIS framework, there should be an all-Crimea referendum on whether the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol should join this union. He declared that the desire of Sevastopol citizens to restore the broken good-neighbor ties with Russia has become a weighty political factor that cannot be disregarded. According to a public poll conducted shortly before [the session], the people of Sevastopol welcome the idea of leasing Sevastopol to Russia and concluding an economic and defense alliance between Russia and Ukraine. Touching on the Black Sea Fleet problem, Ivan Yermakov stated: "If the situation does not change, we will have yet another crisis in October...." He spoke for active consultations with the Russian Government and the Supreme Soviet on the entire range of the region's problems.

U.S. State Department Delegation Visits CIS

WS2209140193 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 21 Sep 93

[Text] Andrew Reynolds, head of a U.S. Department of State delegation that began its visit to CIS countries today, underlined in a press interview that Ukraine has undoubted technical and scientific achievements that are of great interest to the United States. The delegation is going to visit Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, and Kazakhstan. The American specialists will investigate possibilities of cooperation with each of these countries in biotechnology, environment protection, metallurgy, materials technology, and space exploration.

Cooperation Discussed With Czech Military Delegation

WS2209135993 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 21 Sep 93

[Text] Colonel General Anatoliy Lopata, first deputy defense minister, today received a military delegation from the Czech Republic. The sides exchanged information on the status of both countries' Armed Forces and discussed specific military issues. Interest in developing forms of cooperation that would satisfy both Czech and Ukrainian Defense Ministries was expressed.

National Affairs

Supreme Council Holds Session in Kiev 22 Sep

Kravchuk Addresses Session

LD2209212293 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1300 GMT 22 Sep 93

[Speech by President Leonid Kravchuk before the Supreme Council in Kiev—live]

[Text] First, I would like to address the esteemed Supreme Council and the citizens of Ukraine and say that we are discussing an issue of historic significance to us. Undoubtedly, today's discussion has shown that there are two points of view in the Supreme Council and that there are two points of view in Ukraine as well. I am speaking in general terms. I think there is no need to go into details. The deputies have been saying that if we accept one point of view, then another group of people and oblasts will come out against this. It seems to me that today we should not impose one point of view or another on the Ukrainian people. A decision complying with the interests of Ukraine must be made. The interests of Ukraine lie in the fact that we cannot think of our independence unless we put our economy in order. This order consists of two parts: First is our ability to manage and the people's will to work in conditions when relevant legal and managerial normative acts are created and personnel supplied. No union, no agreements, no accession to the unions—I agree with those saying this—will pull Ukraine out of the economic catastrophe, but I would like to say another thing: without the CIS market, Ukraine will not be able to pull itself out of the economic catastrophe either. It will not. I was and I am now in favor of using this market to improve the Ukrainian economy. The simplest statistical data show that 70 percent of products for our industrial production, components, raw materials, or anything else, are received from the CIS countries. Everyone knows this quite well and there is no need to prove this.

If someone has another point of view, let them ask those who are directly involved in managing the production sphere, and they will see. As far as our legislation is concerned, which we have worked out for two or almost two and a half years, this legislation, despite all its shortcomings, is the legislation of our independent state. Today, if we respect ourselves, we cannot ignore the Constitution and the laws and deviate from that legislation by putting a signature on a document that would nullify this legislation. I cannot agree to this, believe me, no matter how strongly they criticize me, either from the right or from the left. And again, I cannot disregard the fact that Ukraine is a CIS member and has signed relevant documents, and today, it will refuse to participate in a meeting of the CIS heads of state or heads of government. In other words, it is necessary to make a final decision. I cannot. Again, when I was saying today that we must take part in all the negotiating processes, I had in mind this exactly.

This means that we should proceed from the fact that talks and finding alternative and compromise solutions is the task of the executive authority and the president, and the Supreme Council should have an understanding attitude to this. Did we do the right thing in letting the Supreme Council discuss this issue? Well, properly speaking, the executive authority was blamed here, but I would like to say, for the record, that I was not the initiator of submitting this issue to the Supreme Council. Deputies at the microphones proposed it, submitted it,

and discussed it, and there is no problem here. I was asked to give information and I did this, but I did not submit this document to the Supreme Council. So this is all in the minutes. Why (?blame) me? Thus, the Supreme Council has discussed the issue.

Let us put the issue in another way: in accordance with article 97, point four, the Supreme Council formulates foreign and domestic policy, and when an important issue is in question, changes in our approaches, then it seems to me that the Supreme Council cannot stand aside. Here Bodelan rightly said that the point is not this, the articles. I say to you sincerely that this treaty, this draft that we have does not suit us and does not suit our legislation in many of its points. I do not want to analyze it; I support it.

The point is something else: whether Ukraine should take part in an economic union and under what status—do you understand—whether to take part in economic agreements and relations. Incidentally, Ivan Stepanovych Plyushch read an article out to you. This is envisaged by the CIS, so there are no problems here.

So I would like us to understand one thing today—and I have already said this—taking into account the fact that there is an opinion from the East and an opinion from the West and that we do not want people's opinions, or the people themselves, to clash, Ukraine, and I, can today take part in economic treaties and economic agreements. If—and this is absolutely understandable—one is to speak of an economic union or community, then we can take part only as an associate member and after having made an appropriate statement. We cannot do anything else today without having changed this situation by means of our legislation and our Constitution.

It seems to me that if the people's deputies understand this situation and do now want to have two Ukraines—I am not trying to frighten anyone. I am against certain dramatic things being announced on this platform, against throwing mud at ourselves, as has happened, and saying that we, in general, and the state are thieves. And just about everything has been said here. Naturally, it does not become us to do this. After all, we have some pride in our people and in ourselves, and whatever the case, we should not speak about all the people and the entire state. If a deputy wants to say that he is like that, that is his right.

I would not like to say that our problem is a very simple one, I would not like to do this. We...[changes thought] What Kozarenko said, believe me, he said everything that he feels himself. Whether this was needed in these words is another matter. But he stated what is going on there regarding this, not simply conversations, but assemblies [passage indistinct].

People's deputies, there is no need to stand today, as we have become used to, in this hall—I have been here for a long time with you, I sat here today and yesterday—stating only my opinion and no other.

If we do not find a compromise solution, we will lose, Ukraine will lose. If someone thinks that something else should be done, history will tell. I do not want to be a prophet in my own state, but he...[pauses] various maxims have been declared here, including the one that Russia has spoken from a domestic position and that Russia has suppressed and is suppressing...[pauses] I do not want to say that this is not so. I want to remind you only of one thing: he, who quarrels with Russia, will lose. This is absolutely clear. And it is also true that we have this situation here in Ukraine, which you know well, and ethnic questions and others. So let us be sensible and not make the situation more tense. Let us find a compromise solution. Any other solution will be hard for Ukraine. So, today I would like to ask you [commotion in the session hall], I would like to ask you not to dramatize the situation and not to incite, excuse me for this word, the people of Ukraine. Not to incite. This is being done. Because the events in Russia proved how dangerous this is.

The events in Russia also proved to us that powers, legislative and executive, must come to an agreement and approach problems constitutionally, as they say. Constitutionally and legally, in a civilized manner, as I have been saying more than once. And today, it is necessary to make a reasonable decision. I have explained to you my point of view. With this point of view, I will go to the meeting. And I ask you to approach the conclusions of today's debate in a reasonable, calm, and balanced manner, with regard to the situation in Ukraine, which you are well aware of. What has been said here and the fact that a certain conclusion has been drawn is very important for Ukraine today. I am just asking you, asking people, citizens of Ukraine to understand that we have one Ukraine, one nation, and God save us from making steps toward dividing this nation. Such attempts are being made. I would ask you to please stop doing this because what we have today is difficult. If someone continues playing the cards and dividing Ukraine, the consequences will be tragic indeed.

Deputies Urge Canceling Kravchuk Moscow Trip

LD2209141693 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1259 GMT 22 Sep 93

[Text] Ukrainian president's press secretary Vladimir Shlyaposhnikov told INTERFAX Wednesday [22 September] that numerous deputies demanded at the today's parliament session, which discussed the draft economic union treaty, that President Kravchuk should cancel his trip to Moscow where he is to attend the CIS summit scheduled for September 24.

Shlyaposhnikov said that Kravchuk told parliament: "You are to debate the draft and make a decision. I will decide myself whwther or not I go to Moscow. I was elected by the people and have a perfect right to sign any documents. It is up to you to ratify them or not."

Shlyaposhnikov also said that there has been no official response on the part of the Ukrainian president to the

yesterday's decree of the Russian president on early parliamentary elections and dissolution of the present parliament.

Council Discusses Economic Union

LD2209210893 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1259 GMT 22 Sep 93

[Text] The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet started discussing the draft treaty on Economic Union at an afternoon session on Wednesday [22 September].

The National Democratic Party deputies subjected the draft to a sharp criticism stating that Ukraine could not sign the proposed document. According to the deputies, this treaty will lead to loss of the republic's sovereignty. However, deputies from the western Ukrainian regions insist that the treaty is signed urgently.

Supreme Soviet Deputy and former Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Council of Nationalities Boris Oleynik suggested that "we should carefully examine the current events in Russia" before signing the treaty. In his words, the parliament is to give "appropriate orders to the Ukrainian intelligence bodies" today.

Chairman of the Parliamentary Commission on International Affairs Dmitriy Pavlychko said in an interview that "the biggest threat today is that the burden of the tragic events in Russia could also spread to Ukraine where supporters of Rutskoy and Khasbulatov have hopefully raised their heads."

Kravchuk Appoints Zvyahilskyy Acting Prime Minister

LD2209143293 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1259 GMT 22 Sep 93

[Text] On Wednesday [22 September], the Ukrainian president appointed Vice- Premier Yefim Zvyahilskyy to the post of acting prime minister.

The Ukrainian president's spokesman Vladimir Shlyaposhnikov told INTERFAX-UKRAINE that Zvyahilskyy would perform the premier's duties as long as is required.

To quote Shlyaposhnikov, the parliament has not fixed any deadline for the formation of the new cabinet. He also said that the appointment of a new prime minister would depend on the parliament's decision to hold early parliamentary elections.

Donetsk Miners To Strike if President Fails To Resign

LD2109134893 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1000 GMT 21 Sep 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Donetsk miners will go on strike if their demands—the resignation of the president and the dissolution of the Supreme Council—are not met, RIA reports. This has been reported by Viktor Vizinok, a member of the Donetsk town strike committee. In the opinion of miners, both the president and the Supreme Council have completely lost the people's faith. Mines will not be sending coal to consumers this week and will go on strike if authorities ignore their demands.

Kuchma Reviews 'Failures' of His Government

LD2309085493 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 22 Sep 93

[Text] On 22 September, People's Deputy of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma held a news conference for local and foreign journalists. The former prime minister expounded his views on the reasons for the failures of the government he headed and on the possible ways out of the current situation in the economy, as well as dwelling on some other problems. Kuchma believes that the government failed to implement economic reform due to the very short period of its activities, the absence of all necessary instruments, and the lack of understanding of the necessity for such changes by all the leaders of the primary links of power. In his opinion, the early termination of the plenary powers of the current composition of the Supreme Council would be for Ukraine's benefit. The formation of an efficient government, in the opinion of its former head, is linked with the election of a new deputy corps. Kuchma believes that the president or the chairman of the Supreme Council could assume responsibility for economic management. Speaking about the agreements of the presidents of Ukraine and Russia on strategic nuclear missiles, the people's deputy referred to the documents signed as a victory of our state. Kuchma also believes that no illusions should be cherished about economic union with the CIS countries. However, a refusal of such an agreement, in his opinion, would isolate Ukraine.

Commentary Predicts 'Authoritarian Rule'

PM2209172793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Sep 93 First Edition p 7

[Vitaliy Panov Commentary: "Seeking a Firm Hand"]

[Text] Ukraine—All the conditions for the advent of authoritarian rule have now been created in Ukraine. The rapid decline in the living standard, which was always higher than the average in Russia, combined with the obvious inability of the majority of representatives of all branches of power to improve the situation, is driving the population to despair. This is also aided by an orgy of frenzied nationalist demagogy, and finally by the much talked about corruption in all the branches of power, which has reached unprecedented proportions.

Plus the universally obvious lack of a national leader. Kravchuk, who laid claim to this role, has finally lost his way between his communist past and national [natsionalnyy] present.

Undoubtedly this rather gloomy scenario depicts the road to dictatorship. The other options are simply being rejected.

In Lvov last Friday Viktor Mikhaylovich Pinzenik, former vice premier of the Ukrainian government responsible for the economic reform, met with the voters. He represents the young, nationally minded technocrats and economists with a serious claim to the establishment of firm power and order in the state. They intend accomplishing this task by instilling order in the economy, which in turn presupposes a change of political course and the organization of new executive structures. Effective economic reforms, in Pinzenik's opinion, can be carried out by a narrow circle of like-minded people with the power to put their ideas into practice.

Here in Lvov these days there have been other proposals for ways to instill order and establish firm power. A whole series of extremely nationalistic parties and organizations, playing on the touchy public reaction to the results of the talks on the Black Sea Fleet and the tenfold rise in bread prices, have formed an extraordinary committee for the salvation of the nation and the state.

The measures which the committee obligingly proposes to adopt have been expressed in the best totalitarian traditions. They presuppose the use of terror on a national basis and civil war in the not too distant future. Igor Kutsyuruba, a member of the social national party, states quite bluntly: "I have long dreamed of a St. Bartholomew's Day massacre of the Russians in Lvov. However, I understand that there are insufficient forces for this at the moment..." However, Andrey Shkil, chairman of the Lvov Oblast organization of the Ukrainian national assembly, believes that "it is only by weapons and the force of the Ukrainian spirit that we will cleanse Ukraine of the vermin inhabiting it..."

In civilized rule-of-law states such things are punishable. In Ukraine, however, the authorities are clearly keeping the extremists in the "patriotic reserve." The militia did not intervene even after a general rehearsal of the pogroms on 5 September when a mob of young people who had come from a rally began smashing store windows with foreign inscriptions on Gorodovskaya Street. The authorities, who have energetically joined in the political activity, are maintaining an olympian calm. Nikolay Goryn, chairman of the Lvov oblast soviet, merely stated with due seriousness that by all accounts the rioters had been organized by someone.

Of course the tendency toward increased danger from the right has intensified the process of registration of members of the reborn Ukrainian Communist Party. In Vinnitsa Oblast there have been plenums and aktiv meetings, which indicates that the whole organizational structure remains in place. Furthermore, few doubt the communists' potential for establishing a firm power. Especially since they have traditionally strong positions in the army.

The only means of avoiding those who want to instill order, be they on the right or the left, something which does not augur well for Ukraine, is the rapid and progressive process of changing the economic foundations of society, but things are not going too well there.

Belarus

Kebich Views Talk With Chernomyrdin, CIS Summit

LD2209174693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1112 GMT 22 Sep 93

[By BELINFORM correspondent Larisa Lazar for TASS]

[Text] Minsk, September 22 (TASS)—Belarussian Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich told his Russion opposite number Viktor Chernomyrdin in a telephone conversation on Wednesday [22 September] that his government had decided to remove unilaterally all customs barriers on exports of goods to Russia, Chernomyrdin reciprocated by promising that the Russian Government will do the same immediately.

Responding to a question from BELINFORM about the forthcoming Commonwealth summit in Moscow, Kebich said "I feel somewhat worried on the whole, but after getting information from some sources and talks with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, I am leaving for Moscow with optimism after all. As for nuances, I will speak about them upon my return.

"The main aim of the upcoming summit is the creation of an economic union. Although we are alarmed by the latest developments which took place in Russia during the past 24 hours and worried about the other republics' attitude to the economic union idea, there is hope for a positive outcome", Kebich said.

Defense Minister Comments on Results of CIS Session

WS2309090193 Minsk VO SLAVU RODINY in Russian 9 Sep 93 p 1

[Interview with Defense Minister Pavel Kozlovskiy by Lieutenant Colonel A. Gulis: "General Colonel Pavel Kozlovskiy: 'Former Republics Should Create National Armies'"; date and place not given]

[Text] We have already informed that a regular session of the council of defense ministers of the CIS states has completed its work.

General Colonel Pavel Kozlovskiy, Belarusian defense minister, has agreed to give an interview to our correspondent.

[Gulis] Pavel Pavlovich, why was this meeting convened?

[Kozlovskiy] The meeting was held on the eve of the meeting of the heads of the CIS states that was scheduled initially for 7 September and later shifted to 24 September. The defense ministers at their meeting and then at the joint meeting with the foreign ministers have discussed the draft documents that will be proposed for consideration and approval by the heads of the CIS states on 27 September in Moscow.

[Gulis] What documents do you mean?

[Kozlovskiy] We have considered three packages of documents. The first set addresses the reorganization of the Chief Command of the CIS United Armed Forces. The second set details the primary measures for the implementation of the Agreement on Collective Security. The third set defines the measures for the normalization of the situation in the Tajik-Afghan border area.

Our delegation participated in the discussion and initialed the document on the reorganization of the Chief Command of the CIS United Armed Forces. In addition, we have initialed the document on the main directions for strengthening the defense capability of the CIS states and bolstering military cooperation.

The Belarusian delegation was present at the session as an observer when the second and the third sets of documents were discussed. The documents were discussed by the states that signed the Tashkent Agreement on Collective Security on 15 May 1992.

[Gulis] Pavel Pavlovich, the latest events on the Tajik-Afghan border demonstrate that the CIS is threatened both with internal and external flare-ups. In connection with this, mothers of Belarusian soldiers are worried about the question: Will their sons perform their military service in the so-called hot spots?

[Kozlovskiy] I have repeatedly stressed over television, radio, and in the press that fathers and mothers should not be anxious about this.

We have discussed the issue of the creation of coalition forces for the defense of Tajik-Afghan border by the CIS members-signatories of the collective security treaty. This includes the countries that border Afghanistan. They are Russia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. These countries will create their coalition armed forces. The collective security system—which Belarus will join in the event the legislature adopts this decision—is based on this principle. The CIS defense will be implemented on its outer borders in the event of any foreign threat. This means that if currently the Tajik border is under threat, the coalition forces are created for the defense of this borderline. Our participation in this action is limited to providing political aid and initiative.

Let us imagine that Belarus has become a member of the collective security system. In the event that our western borders are threatened from the west, the states situated in this region should participate in the defense of Belarus.

Therefore, I want to stress: Do not fear this treaty! In the event that our western borders are threatened with military attack, citizens of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan will not defend us. This principle is the basis of the collective security system which is currently being created.

[Gulis] Are you satisfied with the results of this meeting? Has it any importance to our Republic?

[Kozlovskiy] I have already mentioned that we participated in the discussion of two issues—the reorganization of the Chief Command of the CIS United Armed Forces, and the main directions of strengthening the defense capability of the CIS states and the bolstering of military cooperation. The resolution of these issues should help to create our national armies. The talks at the session of the defense ministers of the CIS states were centered around how to aid the republics in the creation of their national armed forces. The Chief Command of the CIS United Armed Forces will be reorganized into a headquarters for the coordination of military cooperation among the equal states. The idea of the creation of this headquarters is based on the unity of equal states with equal voting rights. Finally, if the state is not satisfied with a decision, it can use its veto right.

U.S. Group Arrives To Discuss Scientific Cooperation

WS2209142693 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0300 GMT 22 Sep 93

[Text] A U.S. interdepartmental delegation on scientific-technical cooperation has arrived in Minsk. The delegation includes the representatives of the U.S. Department of State, the Department of Energy, the Department of Health and Human Services, the National Institutes of Health, and the Environmental Protection Agency. In the opinion of the members of the American delegation, the scientists in Belarus and erstwhile USSR republics have high qualifications and have achieved considerable success in many fields of science which are of great interest to U.S. scientists. During the three days, the guests are going to meet with scientists from the Belarusian Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Radiation Medicine, the State Committee for Ecology, and other institutes and ministries.

Moldova

Snegur Chairs Supreme Security Council Meeting

AU2209203793 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1806 GMT 22 Sep 93

[Text] Chisinau ROMPRES, 22/9/1993—A meeting of the Supreme Security Council of Moldova, presided over by President Mircea Snegur, took place in Chisinau, MOLDOVA-PRES reports.

An analysis was made of the social-political situation in the country and of the steps to be taken in order to secure peace and quietness in society. Special care was shown for the situation in the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova and in the localities with a Gagauz ethnic majority. It was found that the actions of the reactionary forces in Tiraspol were aimed at enhancing the tension in the area and causing new hostilities.

The members of the Supreme Security Council sustained President Mircea Snegur's firm stand on the recent events in the Russian Federation, a stand presented in the telegram sent to his counter-part Boris Yeltsin, MOLDOVA-PRES reports.

Government Dismisses Deputy Defense Minister Petrica

AU2209145193 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1954 GMT 21 Sep 93

[Text] Chisinau, BASAPRESS 21/9/1993—The Moldovan Government decided today to dismiss General Nicolae Petrica from the post of first vice premier of defence and head of the main headquarters. General Petrica told BASAPRESS that this decision of the Minister's Cabinet was illegal. According to the current law, the right to dismiss from such posts belongs only to the president, the supreme commander of the Armed Forces. "The decision was taken after the report of General Creanga" added Petrica. Four months ago, a presidential decree assigned Petrica the rank of general. Nicolae Petrica, one of the commanders of military units which took part in the war of summer 1992, is decorated with the "Stefan cel Mare" (Stephen the Great) order.

14th Army Begins Maneuvers Near Tiraspol

AU2209114693 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1954 GMT 21 Sep 93

[Text] Chisinau, BASAPRESS, 21/9/1993—Today, the military applications of 14th Army started near Tiraspol, Nicolae Turtureanu, head of the section of Military Policy and Treaties of the Moldovan Ministry of Defense, told BASA that the military applications were coordinated with the Headquarters of the Moldovan Ministry of Defense. The military applications include shootings with light arms. Turtureanu said that the visit of Pavel Grachev to Chisinau, planned firstly for September 13th, was postponed for the end of September or the beginning of October. According to reliable sources from Tiraspol, Grachev will visit the 14th Army.

Parliamentarians Condemn Nonratification of CIS Accord

AU2209113293 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1954 GMT 21 Sep 93

[Text] Chisinau, BASSAPRESS, 21/9/1993—The Parliamentary fraction "Soglasie" (Conciliation) published a declaration claiming that the non-ratification of the CIS agreement will instantly aggravate the situation in Moldova. It would paralyze the industry and the agro-industrial complex. The "Soglasie" fraction recommended President Snegur sign the documents concerning Moldova's join to the CIS. The fraction also demands an official decision for a plebiscite on the independence of Moldova and its joining with CIS. In the opinion of its members, the Parliament must support the proposal of its Presidium to examine the law projects

on elections and fix the date of anticipate elections. The Parliament should also demand the government take urgent steps for social protection of the people. It should concentrate on preparing the anticipate elections, according to the fraction's demands.

Social Democrats Advocate Constitutional Convention

MK2209104193 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Sep 93 p 3

[Report by Aleksandr Tago under the "Moldova" rubric: "Social Democrats Offer a New Way To Overcome Parliamentary Crisis. Will the President Be Willing To Take on Responsibility?"]

[Text] Having pushed itself into a corner by its inability to make decisions, the Moldovan parliament called a recess. Deputies went to their districts, where they are awaiting with interest further development of events, on which they now have virtually no influence. Representatives of the parliamentary majority are not intent on taking part in fruitless discussions any longer. The opposition, for its part, is waiting for the Constitutional Commission to finalize its draft of a new constitution and to submit it to parliament for consideration.

Some observers believe that the conflicting factions in parliament are just buying time as they pursue their own ends. An opinion is holding sway that it is Speaker Petr Lucinskiy who is buying time by courting both the opposition and the majority in order to lead them all down the garden path yet another time. Many people think that the speaker is waiting for 24 September, when the meeting of CIS heads of state will resolve many issues, including those regarding Moldova. A Moldovan delegation will attend the meeting, and it plans to sign all the economic documents. Time will soon tell whose forecasts are correct.

Meanwhile, various political forces offer their own ways of solving the crisis, trying to score points among voters in case early elections are called. The Christian Democratic People's Front, which stands for Moldova's unification with Romania, said that the parliamentary majority was trying to impose immediate parliamentary elections by blocking the parliament's work. In the front's view, the purpose of these actions is "to keep neocommunist and pro-CIS forces in power at any cost, forces which hope to remove the executive branch from any control by the parliament and to create a rubber-stamp parliament subordinated to the Snegur government by perpetuating old structures and speeding up general elections." The Agrarian Democratic Party responded that only early elections could help create an efficient legislature able to ensure in practice Moldova's statehood and independence.

The Social Democratic Party, one of the most influential centrist forces in Moldova, has taken a noteworthy stance. At a press conference held on Monday, the social democrats made public their views saying that in a situation where "the legislative branch is virtually paralyzed, an initiative for breaking the impasse should be urgently carried out by the presidential authority." In their view, this stems from the fact that the citizens of the Republic of Moldova directly legitimized it, and also from President Snegur's electoral pledges. Proceeding from this premise, the social democrats chartered a tentative course out of the parliamentary and constitutional crises. This proposal envisages that the head of state should issue an edict on the procedure for convening a Constitutional Convention of the Republic of Moldova and on principles of its functioning. The proposed option calls for entrusting the Constitutional Convention with the sole task of drawing up the Republic of Moldova's constitutional law for the transitional period, which would make it possible to take measures to overcome the crisis once it is adopted by referendum. It is planned that the Constitutional Convention would be made up of deputies who unequivocally stand for calling parliamentary elections, representatives of each of the registered political parties, one representative from each city and district council, and also representatives of the Republic of Moldova's citizens from the Dniester regions and areas with a predominantly Gagauz population. In other words, the social democrats propose setting up a new body that will operate along parallel lines with the moribund parliament. Now we should wait for a reaction from the president.

Tajikistan

Rakhmanov Prepares To Meet CIS, UN Officials

LD2209134293 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Tajik 1000 GMT 22 Sep 93

[Text] As reported from the department of information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan, the head of state and the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan, Imamali Rakhmanov, plans to fly to Moscow on 23 September.

As has been reported, a meeting of the heads of the states of the CIS should take place there.

It is thought that Rakhmanov will fly to the United States immediately after the Moscow summit. He will speak at the 48th UN General Assembly session. Rakhmanov will discuss the social, political, and economic situation in Tajikistan, the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border, and the measures being taken by the government of the Republic of Tajikistan to repatriate refugees.

A meeting between Rakhmanov and UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali is proposed.

Urges Economic Integration

LD2309085393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0503 GMT 23 Sep 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva]

[Text] Dushanbe September 23 TASS—A Tajik state and government delegation, led by Chairman of the republican parliament Imamali Rakhmanov, flew to Moscow today in the morning to take part in the summit meeting of the CIS member states.

Before his departure, the Tajik leader gave a short interview to journalists, in which he expressed hope for the successful outcome of the summit and for the creation of an economic alliance between the CIS member states. Integration will serve the basic interests of nations of the CIS states, including Tajikistan, which is living through a deep economic crisis. Touching upon the latest political developments in Russia, the head of the Tajik parliament supported the democratic reform course, followed by Russian President Yeltsin, but expressed hope for a "constitutional way of resolving problems." "Russian people have enough commonsense and will make their choice by themselves," the Tajik leader pointed out.

Russian Commander Comments on Afghan Border Situation

PM2209155993 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Sep 93 p 1

[Statement by Colonel General A. Nikolayev, commander of Russian Federation Border Troops; place and date not given]

[Text] The political efforts which Russia, Tajikistan, and other states in the central Asian region have been making recently have had a substantial influence on the positive development of the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border. The group of Russian border troops in Tajikistan, the Tajik State Committee on National Security, and the border guards of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, guided by the decisions of the heads of state of the Central Asian region and Russia, are seeking to consolidate the current positive processes on the border with Afghanistan.

At the same time it has to be pointed out that the acuteness of the situation is not diminishing in individual sections of the Tajik-Afghan border. Concern is aroused by the continuing preparations by leaders of the Tajik opposition and by Afghan field commanders to mount large-scale combat operations on the border. Extremists together with Afghan mojahedin are planning to carry out their actions through Gornyy Badakhshan.

This is evidenced by gunmen's repeated attempts to filter across the border and to consolidate their hold on the Shaartuz salient, in the region of the Dari Salamaleykum Gorge. Border posts are continuing to be fired upon from Afghan territory, and groups of gunmen are continuing to cross with weapons on the Pyandzh, Ishkashim, and Moskovskiy salients.

According to information at the disposal of the Russian Federation Border Troops Command, extremists together with Afghan mojahedin are planning to capture and destroy one of the posts of the Moskovskiy Border Detachment.

The Russian Federation Border Troops Command together with the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and corresponding structures of Tajikistan are taking appropriate measures to ensure the servicemen's safety and prevent an armed invasion of the republic's territory.

At the same time we appeal to the field commanders of the Islamic State of Afghanistan. The escalation of combat operations on the Tajik-Afghan border could lead to a new exacerbation of the situation and wreck the normalization of the situation which has become apparent in that region.

All responsibility for possible extremist actions on the border lies entirely with their organizers.

Armenia

Karabakh Leadership Prepared To Extend Cease-Fire

NC2209204493 Yerevan Radio Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1530 GMT 22 Sep 93

[Text] The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic [NKR] leadership is ready to extend the cease-fire agreement by one month and help in the partial return of the refugees to their homes, provided that this is done through talks with the Azerbaijani side. This was stated in Stepanakert during the meeting of Chairman of the NKR Supreme Soviet Karen Baburyan with the delegation of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly.

The members of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly delegation promised to convey this goodwill gesture to the Azerbaijani leadership. The head of the delegation, Medetkan Sherimkulov, said that the initiative of the Karabakh leadership is the main result of the delegation's peace mission. He told the ITAR-TASS correspondent that time, the establishment of contacts, and readiness for talks are needed to find a final solution to the Karabakh crisis. He hoped that the Azerbaijani leadership will accept the proposal to extend the cease-fire by one more month.

President Meets UK Group, Criticizes Stance on Karabakh

NC2309091893 Yerevan Radio Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1530 GMT 22 Sep 93

[Text] President Levon Ter-Petrosyan today received the British parliamentary delegation visiting Armenia headed by Lord Richard (Shannon).

Greeting the British parliamentary group, President Levon Ter-Petrosyan noted that such visits could establish closer mutual understanding between the two countries and future visits could lay the foundations of closer cooperation.

Lord (Shannon) stressed the importance of such visits for establishing ties with Armenia and forming [word indistinct] views on the unceasing conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and in the region. This will help clarify positions during efforts to settle the conflict.

The Armenian president highlighted the importance of correct orientation by the international community on a Karabakh settlement. He noted that Armenia's position on the settlement remains unchanged: First, a cease-fire should be established. Only then should talks be held on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh to achieve peace in the region. He emphasized that the CSCE Minsk Group came to a (?similar) conclusion. This position is conditioned by a concern not to complicate the peace process. This is also why Armenia has not formally recognized the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic's [NKR] independence, which was proclaimed in line with legal and constitutional method. According to the Armenian president, Britain's declaration that Nagorno-Karabakh should remain within Azerbaijan is a factor obstructing a settlement and peace.

Armenian Ambassador to Britain Armen Sargisyan noted after the meeting that efforts must be made to establish close economic ties between Armenia and Britain.

Azerbaijan

Foreign Ministry Statement on Armenian Bombardment

PM2209170793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Sep 93 First Edition p 6

["Trouble Spots" report by Arif Useynov: "Azerbaijan: Foreign Ministry Sounds the Alarm"]

[Text] Baku—One urgent wish that is mentioned in U.S. President B. Clinton's letter to head of Azerbaijan Geydar Aliyev—the speediest resumption of railroad traffic between Baku and Yerevan and Akstafa and Idzhevan—is not going to be realized soon. The railroad section has been put out of action as a result of a massive missile bombardment from a military base on the territory of Noyemberyanskiy Rayon, Armenia. Something similar happened last year on the Megri section of the Baku-Yerevan branch.

In its statement the Azerbaijan Foreign Ministry describes as unacceptable the aggressive actions by the Armenian Armed Forces, which bombarded the territory of a neighboring state with missiles. The statement specifies populated centers in Kazakhskiy Rayon—the villages of Farakhlin, Dashsalakhly, Gaymagly, Ali-Bayramli, and Kemerli—where, as in the actual rayon center of Kazakh, there has been significant destruction of housing, buildings, and enterprisees. Civilians have been killed and injured. All this is happening nearly 300 km from Nagorno-Karabakh, on Azerbaijan's western border with Armenia and Georgia.

The Azerbaijan Foreign Ministry does not rule out the possibility of a further escalation of combat actions in the west of the republic. The truce between Baku and Khankendi has been extended and an accord has been reached on further steps. At the same time, the statement goes on, reports of the withdrawal of armed formations from Kubatlinskiy Rayin and neighboring villages are untrue. In fact, an intensive buildup of heavy equipment and armaments is taking place in this strategically important sector, which gives grounds for expecting a new attack on Zangelanskiy Rayon.

The Foreign Ministry urged the UN Security Council, other international organizations, and the Russian, U.S., Iranian, and Turkish leaders to assist the withdrawal of the Armenian occupation forces from the territory of Azerbaijan.

Foreign Minister Meets U.S., German, UN Envoys

NC2309105993 Baku TURAN in English 1556 GMT 22 Sep 93

[Text] Baku, September 22 (TURAN)—Today the minister of foreign affairs of Azerbaijan Gasan Gasanov received the ambassadors of the USA, Germany and also the head of the temporary office of the UNO in Azerbaijan.

During the meeting with the head of the temporary mission of the UNO Mahmud al-Sa'id the question of the forthcoming presidential elections was touched. M. al-Sa'id said, that he will act as an observer at the elections.

G. Gasanov thanked the UN envoy for the suggestion of giving any humanitarian assistance to Azerbaijan.

During the meeting with the US ambassador Richard Miles the problems of the bilateral cooperation, as well as the problems of regulating of the Armenian-Azeri conflict within the framework of the CSCE were touched.

During the meeting with the charge d'affaires of Germany in Azerbaijan Thomas Terstegen the problem of refugees was in the center of the discussion. T. Terstegen informed the minister about the decision of the European Community to build in one of the regions of the Republic a camp for the 10 thousand Azeri refugees. He said, that two German enterprises was charged with the realization of this plan.

G. Gasanov qualified this project as the biggest assistance to the Azeri refugees, provided under the umbrella of the humanitarian assistance of the West.

Two Candidates Register for Presidential Election

NC2309092593 Baku Azerbaycan Radio Televiziyasi Television Network in Azeri 1600 GMT 21 Sep 93

[Text] The Central Election Commission met today chaired by Chevher Veliyev. The meeting noted that in addition to the Supreme Soviet Chairman Geydar Aliyev, who executes the powers of president, two more candidates for the post of president have been put forward. The meeting heard briefly about the new nominees.

Nominee Kerar Salman ogly Abilov was born in 1930 and received higher education. He lectures at the Russian Language and Literature Institute at the Azerbaijan Pedagogical Academy named after Birzesefeli Akhundov. He was nominated by the Central Committee of the Vakhid Azerbaijan Party. Some 20,140 signatures were collected supporting Abilov's candidacy.

The other candidate Zakir Makhmud ogly Tagiyev was born in 1948. He has a higher education and is a businessman. He is the vice president of the Azerbaijan-Ukraine Society. He was nominated by the Central Committee of Azerbaijan's Gummet Party. Some 20,970 signatures were collected supporting Tagiyev's candidacy.

The members of the Central Election Commission announced that the candidates' documents were prepared in line with the law and registered Kerar Salman ogly Abilov and Zakir Makhmud ogly Tagiyev as candidates for the post of Azerbaijan's president.

Georgia

Further on Fighting in, Around Sukhumi; Plane Downed

Defense Ministry Report

LD2209122593 Tbilisi IBERIA in Georgian 1015 GMT 22 Sep 93

[Text] Sukhumi, 22 Sep—The Georgian Defense Ministry press center has told an IBERIA correspondent that Sukhumi remained tense during the night, with positional fighting continuing on the outskirts of the city. The Abkhazian side launched a pre-dawn attack on the city from Tavisupleba. At the same time, Sukhumi was bombed.

The Georgian Armed Forces are beating back the enemy attack by returning fire and not allowing it to enter the city.

Situation 'Extremely Tense'

LD2209174093 Tbilisi CONTACT INFORMATION AGENCY in Russian 1613 GMT 22 Sep 93

[Text] [No dateline as received] According to a report from the press service of the Ministry of Defense of Georgia, the situation in the conflict zone in Abkhazia remains extremely tense. The enemy is not ceasing his assault on the city of Sukhumi. Since morning there have been several unsuccessful attempts to enter the city and occupy the airport. Suffering considerable losses, the Abkhazian side retreated. Sukhumi airport continued operating.

At daybreak today Georgian troops resumed offensive operations in Ochamchire Rayon. After brief combat the territory in the area of the village of Tamish was completely cleared. The bridge in the village has been restored. At the present stage battles are in progress for the Anuarkhu Height, which is in the area of Akhali Kindghi.

Troops Said Besieged

LD2209175093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1320 GMT 22 Sep 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Shevtsov]

[Text] Moscow September 22 TASS—According to reports coming from the zone of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, Abkhazian armed formations continue to advance in all directions. The Abkhazian Defence Ministry reported that a group of Georgian troops had been encircled in a new district of Sukhumi. A considerable number of Georgian soldiers have been blockaded in the area of the regional hospital. Since

Wednesday [22 September] morning, the Abkhazian artillery has paralyzed the Sukhumi airport and it was shut down.

Russian military sources stationed in Gudauta reported that the Georgian side had lost control of the fighting in the area of Sukhumi and is asking for help. Abkhazian formations have seized a TV tower on the northern outskirts of the city and took the Sukhumi heights under their control.

At 19:35 p.m. on September 21, the Georgian side shelled the 24th Laboratory in the settlement of Esheri. Three out of six shells exploded on the territory of the laboratory. No casualties among Russian servicemen have been reported.

The Georgian air force has been bombarding Abkhazian positions within the boundaries of Sukhumi and a number of settlements of the Ochamchira region.

According to reports provided by a group of Russian airborne troops in Gudauta, a TU-134 plane, on a commercial flight between Sochi and Sukhumi, crashed at 16:05 p.m. on Tuesday at a distance of eight kilometers from the Sukhumi lighthouse and fell into the sea. The causes of the accident have not been established yet.

Air traffic controllers have not registered the plane having been shelled by thermal rockets. There were 22 passengers and six crew on board.

Ukrainian Mercenaries Said Among Casualties

LD2209215493 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1200 GMT 22 Sep 93

[Text] Another report from Sukhumi, this time from the Press Service of the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet: Yesterday correspondents of Abkhazian TV filmed the fighting in Sukhumi. Many Ukrainian mercenaries were discovered among the dead on the Georgian side. The cameramen filmed the dead and their passports.

Shevardnadze Sees Improvement

LD2209173293 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1500 GMT 22 Sep 93

[Text] Because of fierce battles in the Tamishi area, telephone links between Tbilisi and Sukhumi were cut. Communication service workers are saying that the connection will soon be restored.

Despite the difficulties, Vazha Lortkipanidze, the head of state's chief of staff, spoke with Eduard Shevardnadze over a special radio connection at 1400 today.

The head of state said the situation in Sukhumi is getting better and yesterday and today forces comprising experienced soldiers entered Sukhumi. The separatists planned a major attack on Sukhumi but their attempts were wrecked. It is noteworthy that it is mostly mercenaries who are fighting on the side of the Abkhazians. Our combatants reclaimed some strategically important positions despite the fact that the main forces have not yet been engaged in battles.

The situation is better in Ochamchire. Our armed forces are advancing toward Sukhumi more actively. At the moment, battles are under way near the village of Kindghi, on the (Anachi) mountain which is strategically important. This is the most complex section in the Sukhumi-Ochamchire highway.

Those forces which yesterday were opposed to each other [state troops and Kobalia's formations], are fighting side by side and they will soon enter Sukhumi together. I assess this event as a major one and attach a great political and national importance to it. I hope that when they enter Sukhumi we shall sit together, hold a discussion, and make the decision which will be important for Georgia's welfare.

I would like to thank those who, despite great hardship and personal sacrifice, are doing their best to support the servicemen and the civilians here [in Sukhumi] and save Georgia.

I would like to stress especially our soldiers' bravery for the sake of saving Georgia's integrity and its honor. Despite great hardship, they are performing truly heroic wonders fighting virtually with bare hands, Eduard Shevardnadze said in conclusion.

Shevardnadze Notes Reinforcements

LD2309014393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 2356 GMT 22 Sep 93

[By GIA correspondent for TASS]

[Text] Tbilisi, 23 Sep—"Emergency measures are being taken to defend Sukhumi," Eduard Shevardnadze, the Georgian head of state, told a GIA-TASS correspondent in an interview tonight. "Military subunits have been reinforced with a sufficient number of well-trained fighters. At the same time, the battles are not dying down on the outskirts of the town. There are individual attempts by the separatists to break through by roundabout routes. But thanks to the dedication of our soldiers, all battle positions are being fully held on to."

"But the separatists have committed yet another barbaric act: shooting down a second passenger aircraft. I remember the reaction of world public opinion when the Korean airliner was shot down: It literally shocked everyone. In Sukhumi two aircraft carrying civilians have been shot down in two days. I think this should shake the whole world.

"The offensive of Georgian Armed Forces in Ochamchirskiy Rayon is continuing successfully. They have approached Sukhumi. If it proves possible to break through the Zugdidi-Ochamchire blockade, a free zone will be created from Tbilisi through western Georgia to Sukhumi."

Thus, Shevardnadze said, a corridor is being created which, unlike the corridor proposed by the Abkhaz separatists, will be a corridor of justice, integrity, and victory for Georgia, and which will eventually reach the Psou River.

Sukhumi Airport Said Open

LD2309092693 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 0800 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] First of all, dear radio listeners, you are expecting news about Abkhazia. We have been trying to get through to Abkhazia, but so far it has been impossible. The connection with Sukhumi has not been restored yet, so we shall rely on this morning's report.

We had a direct telephone connection with Ochamchire administrator Khuta Guguchia, who said that Georgian troops are carrying out successful attacks in Ochamchirskiy Rayon where, together with the state troops, Colonel Loti Kobalia's armed formations are fighting.

By this morning, it had become evident that the Georgian side controls Tamishi, Akhali Kindghi, and Tsagera, which are strategically important as the Sukhumi-Ochamchire railway line and highway pass through these villages.

On 22 September, Abkhaz information services and Russian mass media spread reports that Abkhaz formations had practically besieged Sukhumi Airport which, allegedly, had stopped functioning. The press center of the Georgian Defense Ministry categorically denied this report and dismissed it as the Abkhaz side's most recent misinformation effort. In fact, the airport is functioning and there are flights to various parts of the republic.

Passenger Plane Downed

LD2309084493 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 0400 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] Yesterday evening at 1800, Abkhaz separatists committed another barbaric act. They downed a Tu-154 passenger plane, registration number 35164, owned by the Georgian air base, at Sukhumi airport. The plane was in flight from Tbilisi to Sukhumi.

A heat-seeking missile was launched at the plane from an Abkhaz military launch in the sea. Most of the passengers were killed. The number of dead is being clarified. The pilot of the plane, Giorgi Razmadze, and the crew members displayed real heroism by landing the plane at Sukhumi airport despite serious damage.

According to the data obtained through official sources, Abkhaz separatists were shooting at other passenger planes carrying people and humanitarian aid all day yesterday. This looks like desperation on their part.

In particular, yesterday evening, another passenger plane flying from Tbilisi to Sukhumi came under fire, plane No. 65001. The passengers and the plane escaped unharmed.

At Least 80 Dead

LD2309024193 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0000 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] As we have already reported, on the evening of 22 September the Abkhazian formations shot down a Tu-154 passenger aircraft belonging to the Tbilisi air detachment flying from Tbilisi to Sukhumi. A heat-seeking missile was fired at the aircraft from an Abkhazian military launch at sea. As INTERFAX has learned, at least 80 people have died as a result of fire. Rescuers only managed to save about 20 passengers from the fire.

Georgian Delegation Absent From Commission Session

LD2209180193 Tbilisi IBERIA in Georgian 1630 GMT 22 Sep 93

[Text] Gudauta, 22 Sep (IBERIA-NEGA)—Nodar Khashba, head of the Abkhaz delegation [at the Georgian-Abkhaz talks], said that the Georgian representatives did not reappear at the joint commission session after they took time out on 21 September, and that the Abkhaz side intends to sign the ceasefire agreement.

He also declared that thousands of combatants have arrived from Ukraine to support the Georgian forces.

Abkhazians Inform Chikvaidze of Summit Proposal

LD2209191493 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1741 GMT 22 Sep 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 22 Sep (ITAR-TASS)—The Abkhazian side has proposed to hold a summit between Georgia and Abkhazia. An ITAR-TASS correspondent was informed from the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet that Georgian Foreign Minister Aleksandr Chikvaidze has been notified about the initiative of the Abkhazian side.

This initiative, according to the Abkhazian side, was taken in order to avoid further bloodshed and expansion of the Georgian-Abkhazian war. Today, it was claimed, the Abkhazian side is still refraining from decisive offensive actions against Sukhumi in order to avoid numerous casualties among the civilian population.

Black Sea Fleet To Aid Refugees Fleeing Battles

LD2309113393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0910 GMT 23 Sep 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Roman Zadunayskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 23 September—The Black Sea Fleet has come to the aid of refugees fleeing the ring of fire from the battles in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. Today Admiral Eduard Baltin, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, at the request of the Georgian Government and with the consent of Russia and Ukraine, dispatched a squadron of Black Sea Fleet vessels to the Sukhumi area to carry out a humanitarian peace mission. The squadron includes the rescue ship Epron, the hydrographic ship GS-402, and the minesweeper Snayper. Leading the operation has been entrusted to Commander [kapitan vtorogo ranga] Anatoliy Ishimov, chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet squadron of search and rescue vessels.

The Black Sea Fleet commander demanded from the Georgian and Abkhaz sides guarantees of safety for the fleet's ships. Since only the Abkhaz leadership has as yet given these guarantees, the Black Sea Fleet ships have been ordered not to approach closer than three km from the Abkhaz coast.

In the near future there will be another squadron of Black Sea Fleet ships composed of the large amphibious warfare ships BDK-69 and Olshanskiy and the patrol ship Ladniy. It is expected that the Black Sea Fleet ships will be able to bring more than 2,000 people out of the danger zone.

General Views Incidents Involving Russian Troops

NC2209134693 Yerevan SNARK in English 1228 GMT 22 Sep 93

[Text] Tbilisi, September 22 (SNARK)—The case with two Russian border officers' kidnapping is the planned action, to my mind. I don't think that it has been done by criminal elements, General-Major Pavelo Tarasenko, the border troops head deputy of the Transcaucasian Region said in SNARK interview commenting today the incident in Tbilisi in September 21. I wonder, why the military car without the identification signs with the kidnapped officers wasn't stopped under the terms of state of emergency". [no opening quotation marks as received]

As to the murder of one frontier guard and the kidnapping of two others on the same day in Tbilisi, according to Tarasenko's words, the criminals has acted in this case. Although, he considers, there may be a connection between two facts.

Characterizing the reasons for the above-mentioned facts, Pavel Tarasenko has expressed the opinion that to all appearances, somebody needs to make the Russian frontier guards angry, to force them leave Georgia, to break still existing weak bridges between Georgia and Russia.

On the occasion the general-major reminded that there are agreements between Russia and Georgia. According to it the Russian border forcers defend the Georgian-Turkish border. Simultaneously Pavel Tarasenko appreciated positively the reaction of Shevardnadze and the Georgian Internal Affairs Ministry to the fact and mentioned that the officers of the Ministry assist in investigation of the crimes. "The Russian border troops will be still of use for Georgian people" said Tarasenko.

Estonia

Prime Minister Defends Arms Purchase Deal With Israel

WS2209130893 Tallinn BNS in English 1826 GMT 21 Sep 93

[Text] TALLINN, Sept 21, BNS—The arms purchase agreement signed between Estonia and Israel was concluded at favorable terms for Estonia and is also an example to the other Baltic countries, Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar said.

Laar in an interview answered criticism by MP Toomas Alatalu, who has said repeatedly that the deal hit Estonia's interests and was illegal, because concluded without priorly informing the parliament. Alatalu says buying arms from Israel means Estonia's distancing from the common arms purchase policies of the three Baltic countries.

Estonia last winter signed a 50 million dollar agreement with Israel on the purchase of weapons. The Eesti Ekspress weekly now says the actual value of the purchase would be 60 million dollars.

Laar accused Alatalu of playing a political game on the account of the interests of the Estonian state.

The prime minister said the agreement had been shown to the parliamentary state defense commission at the beginning of this year, and at that time no member of the commission pronounced any criticism. The commission then gave its chairman the powers to closer examine the agreement, but didn't suggest that the document should be discussed by the parliament.

"If the (parliamentary) state defense commission considers it necessary, the government is ready to submit the document for the parliament's approval," Laar said.

He said the document put no additional obligations upon Estonia. "What we have here is no credit agreement, but a large purchase, which arrives in Estonia in consignments at different times, and the payment schedule of which is extended over several years. The money necessary for paying for the arms comes from the state budget," the prime minister said.

Mart Laar also pointed at a communique signed by the prime ministers of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in Tallinn on Sept. 13, in which the three countries express their intention to re-equip their defense forces with arms under the NATO standards.

"The purchase of Israeli arms helped us out of being dependent on the East and was also an example for the other Baltic countries," Laar said.

The prime minister said that cancellation of the agreement would stop Estonia's transition to weapons of the NATO standard for a longer period of time and would substantially bring down the country's defense capacity. Laar said the opposition's assaults also endangered Estonia's credibility as trade partner.

"The opposition lacks any constructive program for improving the weapon supply of the Estonian defense forces. But this only adds to attempts to fail the favorable agreement signed by the government," Laar said in his interview with BNS.

Opposition Says Deal Unconstitutional

WS2309103293 Tallinn ETA NEWS BULLETIN in English 0730 GMT 23 Sep 93

[From 23 September RAHVA HAAL, p 1, 2]

[Excerpt] Thursday, September 23—The consultative and cooperation council of 12 leading opposition politicians demanded the government yesterday to make public all documents concerning the weapons purchase from Israel. The council also approached the Justice Chancellor, appealing to declare invalid the document on Estonia's material obligations concerning the transaction.

The statement, signed by Edgar Savisaar and Tiit Vahi, pointed out that the weapons deal is a violation of the constitution. The opposition members also stressed that Prime Minister Mart Laar had lied when assuring that the government had made no loans in connection with the deal. The government had actually made a 5 million dollar loan at the North-Estonian Bank without including it in the national budget or coordinating it with the parliament. The government had also sold bills of exchange without sufficient guarantee which are sold in Austria, the politicians announced. Since it is unknown, who is purchasing the bills, their owner may gain control over Estonia's economy (the entire sum reached 800 million kroons), they warned.

The politicians accused the government of hiding the structure, amount and price of the weapons purchased, thus making it impossible to judge the efficiency of the transaction. They further demanded that the government disclosed, who, if anybody, received commission from the deal. [passage omitted]

Government To Privatize Agricultural Enterprises

WS2209110893 Tallinn ETA NEWS RELEASE in English 1840 GMT 21 Sep 93

[Text] Tallinn, September 21—Estonian government decided to privatize 21 farm product manufacturing enterprises, the main buyers being agricultural cooperatives, which are at a favoured position in doing so, Peeter Vilimaa, the head of the reform department of the Ministry of Agriculture, told ETA.

Agricultural cooperatives can pay ten per cent of the sales price while concluding the sales contract. The rest of the sum can be paid by hire-purchase system in ten years time, the interest rate of the unpaid sum being 15 per cent a year.

Only when a farm product manufacturing enterprise is not sold to an agricultural cooperative, can other buyers participate at the public sale, Vilimaa added.

The price of the enterpises is yet to be decided by the Privatization Agency.

Latvia

Ulmanis, Talbott Discuss Russia, Troop Withdrawal

PM2209171193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Sep 93 First Edition p 6

[Report from ITAR-TASS, LOGOTIP-KP column]

[Text] Bilateral relations between Latvia and Russia were touched on during the meeting between Guntis Ulmanis, president of this Baltic republic, and Strobe Talbott, adviser to the U.S. President and special ambassador.

The president told journalists later that during the conversation he had gotten the impression that the United States, Russia, and other countries want to see the withdrawal of the Russian army from the territory of Latvia and Estonia take place as soon as possible. The president told the visitor that he would be going to Russia after addressing the UN General Assembly on 29 September.

Consular Agreement Concluded With Poland

LD2109172293 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 2000 GMT 20 Sep 93

[Text] [Word indistinct] a planned visit to the United States, Latvia's Foreign Minister Georgs Andrejevs and Jaroslaw Lindenberg, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Poland to Latvia, exchanged ratification papers on consular convention between both states at the Latvian Foreign Ministry on Monday, 20 September. The convention lays down conditions for visits by citizens of one state to the other.

Andrejevs added that the conclusion of such a convention was the next step following the introduction of a visa-free regime and that Poland was the first state with which Latvia had concluded such an agreement.

The agreement came into force on Monday, immediately after the exchange of ratification papers.

83% of Residents Said Below Subsistence Wage Level

WS2109150193 Riga LETA in English 0910 GMT 21 Sep 93

[Excerpt] Riga, September 21 (LETA)—According to the figures provided by the statistics committee of the Republic of Latvia, 83 per cent of Latvian residents had income lower than subsistence wage in 1992. However, the results are somewhat biassed as part of those 83 per cent had other, undeclared income or considerable movable or immovable property but the general income declaration could be introduced only starting the next year. These were the key themes discussed by government and municipal officials, public organizations of all the parliamentary factions as well as religious representatives on Monday [20 September] at a meeting aimed to reach an agreement on coordination of efforts to improve living standards of indigent Latvian residents. As a result, several concrete agreements were concluded. [passage omitted]

Lithuania

Butkevicius Discusses 'Provocation' by Servicemen

LD2109223093 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 0740 GMT 21 Sep 93

[News conference by Defense Minister Audrius Butkevicius; Gecas, chief of the Volunteer National Defense Service; and Ignas Stankovicius, director of the Defense Ministry's domestic and foreign department, at the parliament building—live; broadcast in progress]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted on Butkevicius commenting on situation regarding a group of armed servicemen from the Volunteer National Defense Service which withdrew into the forests near Kaunas]

[Butkevicius] I would like to clarify the situation at this stage. After investigating, I cannot say that this action by the volunteers is either a mutiny or rebellion or that it is pursuing the interests of an individual group. I can clearly say that it is a well-planned political provocation that my colleagues sitting here next to me have observed.

Note that the preparation of a provocation on this scale started quite some time ago and was carried out systematically. Various rumors about a possible coup d'etat were spread constantly, and the Volunteer National Defense Service was rumored as a potential organizer of such a coup. If we talk about relations with the military structures in general, a certain influence has been exerted on them from one or another political force, especially on the volunteer service. [passage omitted]

Let us have a look at what happened after the news broke about rebellion and disobedience in the Lithuanian Army. The idea collapsed that in the near future a military structure operating under the principles of democracy and demands of civil democratic control could be set up in Lithuania. Therefore, naturally, all our contacts and links with our Western colleagues are now placed under serious doubts. [passage omitted] In addition, the authority of the volunteer service and national defense system in general was hard hit. [passage omitted]

A third issue is a political one. The volunteers who deserted to the forest were not alone. They had constant consultations about what their move should be after they received the defense minister's order to return home.

[passage omitted] The second step taken was setting up a commission by the Seimas, whose plenipotentiary powers are absolutely undefined. [passage omitted] The above commission appealed against my order. When I met the volunteers in the forest, they presented me a document saying, minister, members of the Seimas (?say) you have no right to order us to return home. If the situation were not so sad, it would be very funny indeed. Therefore, the foundations were laid for the first time in the history of the Lithuanian Armed Forces for disobeying orders. And the foundation was laid with the knowledge of members of the Seimas. [passage omitted]

[Gecas] After two days, that is yesterday at about 1900, having realized how the implementation of the scenario will proceed, I handed in my resignation to the defense minister asking him to release me from the post of chief of the Volunteer National Defense Service headquarters. [passage omitted]

Apart from some political demands, all other social demands placed by the group are right and I support them. [passage omitted]

I did not hand in my resignation because I cannot lead the volunteer service. First, this is my protest against those who are attempting to politicize this structure, to involve it in politics and use the people's problems, interests, even their lives... [pauses] for their objectives. If we continue to escalate this situation, if we continue see this group in an attempt to drag them this way and that way, well, then who knows how it will end. [passage omitted]

[Stankovicius] [passage omitted] The question arose whether a military structure not involved in internal political struggle was possible in an antagonized society. We believed then that the antagonism was not sufficiently deep and that nobody would ever dare use such an instrument as the army for internal political struggle in Lithuania.

This issue is pressing not only in Lithuania, but also in other countries of the former Soviet Union. Therefore, when I meet my colleagues from other countries at conferences, say from Ukraine and other countries, I ask them whether they will set up a voluntary defense service, a home guard. Their answer is that this is a very good military structure. [passage omitted] However, they also say that today it is very dangerous to have such military structures; a civil war could be triggered immediately because society is too polarized. I believe Lithuanian politicians realize the danger of using military structures for internal political struggle. [passage omitted]

[Butkevicius] To date, Lithuanian politicians have not made up their minds on the issue of what is needed for our state's defense and to what degree we are going to defend it? What structures are needed for this type of defense? As it happens, the national defense system developed faster than the constantly changing Lithuanian political mosaic. [passage omitted] However, on the part of the politicians, it is not yet clear whether the national defense system is needed anyway. I can count the number of those people who have visited military units on the fingers of my hand. [passage omitted] The Lithuanian national defense system was left on its own. Somebody somewhere said that if the state should be defended, then let the defense system as such exist, although its problems do not concern us. [passage omitted]

This incident is for the procurator's office to investigate. Because I will help the procurator's office with their enquiries, I will restrain from any comments and ask my colleagues to do the same.

At this moment, weapons have not been laid down. The Seimas commission is there, and perhaps they will reach an agreement to do this. Who is in control of the situation? The situation is controlled by those who provoked it. [passage omitted]

Whether I see here certain interests by forces beyond Lithuania's borders, I can say for certain that all this is very useful to them. If anyone today is interested in preventing Lithuania's integration into West European security systems, then a great job has been done [word indistinct]. [passage omitted]

Concerning the number of servicemen in this group, let us say there are about 60 people. People are rotating there. Some come, stay a while, then leave. They have been friends for three years. [passage omitted]

[?Gecas] I was talking to the battalion commander the other day and he told me the following: I have eight litas in the battalion's bank account. My debt is about 30,000 litas for food for the servicemen. Let me ask you, is this not a mockery of the armed forces? And is it not a miracle that an army such as this—in debt, without food or clothing, of low moral—has remained stable to this day?

[Butkevicius] For two months the state budget owned us [the Defense Ministry] 13 million litas. To date the budget owes us 10 million litas. [passage omitted] So the question, therefore, is whether or not the armed forces are needed. [passage omitted]

'Mutinous Volunteers' Return to Units

LD2209204093 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 2000 GMT 22 Sep 93

[Text] A BALTIC NEWS SERVICE correspondent was told at 2030 this evening by Seimas member Nikolajus Medvedevas that the Voluntary National Defense Service [SKAT] incident has ended and that the mutinous volunteers have returned to their units and handed in their weapons.

It is true that at 1930 a large group of mutinous SKAT members invaded the headquarters of the Kaunas district territorial defense. According to witnesses, for more than half an hour they were settling their personal accounts. An ambulance was not called. Those who witnessed the fight became convinced once again that some volunteers have more brawn than brain.

Seimas member Nikolajus Medvedevas stated that [words indistinct] one truck carrying volunteers returning from the forest [words indistinct].

President Brazauskas Interviewed on Current Issues

PM2209143393 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 21 Sep 93 p 7

[Interview with President Algirdas Brazauskas by correspondent Vladimir Zarovskiy; place and date not given: "'We Have To Rectify Our Mistakes'"]

[Text] [Zarovskiy] Mr. President, what should relations between Lithuania and Russia be like, in your view?

[Brazauskas] Without any doubt Lithuanian-Russian relations are assuming the nature of normal, civilized bilateral relations. Since the Russian Army's withdrawal completely new prospects for our relations have been emerging. My future meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin will, I believe, open a new page in their history. We have always supported the efforts of Russian politicians aimed at strengthening democracy and the market economy. We well understand that this task is important not just for Russia but for the whole world too. The processes taking place among our neighbors will also, in my opinion, have an impact on Lithuanian-Russian relations. They will, I have no doubt, gradually develop on the basis of good-neighborliness and equitable, mutually beneficial trade. That is in keeping with both countries' long-term interests.

[Zarovskiy] Will Lithuania be able to become a bridge between East and West?

[Brazauskas] We would like that. The bridge principle is one of the most important in our foreign policy. We will endeavor to create in Lithuania the most acceptable conditions for investments, customs duties, and taxes for entrepreneurs, tourism, and transit. Lithuania's geopolitical position makes this incumbent upon us. While a priority task of Lithuanian foreign policy is to seek integration within the European Community and other European structures.

[Zarovskiy] What will relations with Kaliningrad Oblast be like?

[Brazauskas] That issue is a topical one for both countries. The ties already developed with Kaliningrad Oblast are very important. Only tactful cooperation with it can help achieve the required accords. The phased demilitarization of the oblast and the creation of a free trade zone there would make it possible to play a mediating role between East and West and increase trust in Russia's policy.

[Zarovskiy] Will Lithuania consequently seek to become a member of NATO?

[Brazauskas] Lithuania will seek to integrate itself within the European security structure. But while seeking close relations with NATO we are not setting unrealistic tasks at this period. Our prospects will greatly depend on overall developments in Central and Eastern Europe.

[Zarovskiy] How is the issue of the borders with Belarus, Kaliningrad Oblast, and Latvia being tackled?

[Brazauskas] There are still outstanding issues. Two contested areas remain with Belarus, but we should reach agreement in the very near future. With Latvia the situation is better, but a few problems also remain here. The process of demarcating the border with Kalingrad Oblast is proceeding, and I hope that a delimitation treaty will soon be signed.

[Zarovskiy] Why has a treaty not been signed with Poland and Belarus?

[Brazauskas] There is only one problem in the treaty with Poland under preparation—the assessment of historical events in Vilnius District in 1919-1940. It has been agreed that this question will be raised in the general declaration which will be jointly signed with the treaty. The text of the declaration is currently being agreed.

An interstate treaty with Belarus is also being prepared. Many departments are involved in this work, and that is why perhaps it is not moving along as quickly as we would like.

[Zarovskiy] Many people are leaving Lithuania out of a fear of nationalism, but many others nevertheless remain...

[Brazauskas] We showed concern for nationalities problems back at the start of our revival. We were the first in Eastern Europe when in 1989 we adopted a law on national minorities, and at the start of 1990 we formed a nationalities department and the Nationalities Studies Center.

Republic and rayon newspapers—some of them subsidized by the state—come out in Russian and Polish. There are programs in Russian and Polish on radio and television. We have a separate radio station broadcasting in Polish. "Ostankino" is broadcast, as is some Polish and Russian television. There are 87 Russian and 58 Polish schools in Lithuania. You can study at technical and vocational colleges in Russian, and there are 16 specialized secondary establishments and 11 higher educational establishments. Moreover, they enjoy an exceptional privilege—quotas for admission to higher education establishments. Services in Catholic and Orthodox churches are conducted in Polish and Russian, and Russian schools can opt to give instruction in the Orthodox faith.

In localities where there is a concentrated population of national minorities the local language is used on a par with the state language at all levels of the state system. Ultimately exceptional political privileges have been given to organizations of national minorities, which

serve as a safeguard for their status [privilegirovanniy baryer] at elections to the Seimas.

Compare this with other countries of Europe even and you will see that the Lithuanian state is really considerate toward the life of national minorities.

[Zarovskiy] Yet not all is well among Lithuanians, I mean between those who have emigrated and those who live in the republic. The emigrants regard the present authorities as neocommunist, while they still have property, land... left here.

[Brazauskas] Many emigrants from Lithuania—and there are around 1 million of them living in Western countries—are very interested today in the revived Lithuania and are keen to help it with their knowledge and the offer of various services. The question of dual citizenship is very relevant today. Quite a few emigrants want to obtain Lithuanian citizenship in order to return here to live or visit unimpeded, to work for its benefit, and to make a mark in social and economic activity. This question must be resolved in the very near future.

Some tens of thousands of Lithuanians live on the territory of Poland and Belarus. But these are not emigrants but people who remained in the former ethnographic area of Lithuania through force of historical circumstances. Lithuania maintains close links with them and pays attention to their education and culture. Quite a few Lithuanians live in Siberia, where they were exiled during the occupation by Stalin's USSR. We are interested in returning them home as quickly as possible, but this process is proceeding with difficulty today because of the economic crisis.

[Zarovskiy] We have moved imperceptibly on to Lithuanian domestic policy. I want to ask you who will pay the pensions of the reserve officers of the Soviet Army who remain in Lithuania.

[Brazauskas] According to the treaty on social provision for former officers which is under preparation, pensions will be paid by Russia through a correspondent account in a Lithuanian bank.

[Zarovskiy] At the dawn of Lithuanian perestroyka there was much discussion about returning property to its former owners. Some people were joyful, others fearful. At one stage—two years ago—this process got out of control even—I can remember the undisguised anxiety felt by peasants and the plight of people evicted from their homes.

[Brazauskas] We have the heavy burden of rectifying the mistakes committed by the previous authorities, who made the decision to return nationalized property to its former owners. This concerns housing.

It is even more difficult with the restoration of land. The majority of those claiming land are villagers. Returning land to someone who is not prepared to cultivate it will affect the level of agricultural output. At the same time people who have set themselves up on someone else's land and who work it wholeheartedly... Ownership claims far outweigh the land left available, as large areas have been taken over by cities or have had houses or production facilities built on them. There are very many problems here.

[Zarovskiy] Lithuania may, from my layman's perspective, have to hand land over not just to its own citizens but to foreigners, too.

[Brazauskas] The sale of land to foreign citizens and enterprises is forbidden here by the Lithuanian Republic Constitution. This can be corrected at the present stage. But we must first complete the land reform, therefore the unrestricted sale of land to foreigners now could produce many extra problems. We are responsive to foreign investors' complaints when they invest capital in our economy and cannot acquire land. Amendments have now been made to the law on foreign investments, a 99-year lease for land has been established, and foreign investors have also been guaranteed the right to extend their lease. The payment for leasing a plot of land cannot vary throughout the term of the agreement.

[Zarovskiy] But I do not understand why in that case the privatization of state facilities is such hard going. If they are virtually ownerless everything should, it seems, be the other way round.

[Brazauskas] More than 75 percent of the state stock of apartments has now been privatized and around 85 percent of state property in agriculture likewise. All small-scale facilities have been privatized. What remains is not very suitable for the private activity of entrepreneurs. Most of the major unprivatized enterprises are on the verge of bankruptcy. The pace of privatization has therefore slowed considerably.

[Zarovskiy] Could you say whether the right-wing opposition headed by Vytautas Landsbergis, former chairman of the Supreme Council and your constant political rival, helps you to resolve these very important questions? And why in general it has such a large influence on the Seimas and the president?

[Brazauskas] Assessments may differ as to the kind of influence enjoyed. The Seimas contains not just the faction headed by Landsbergis but the center opposition too. The assessments and proposals made by both are carefully listened to and scrupulously analyzed. It is the president's duty to seek accords and agreements among the different political forces, as this, after all, strengthens stability in the state and makes society more steadfast in the face of difficulties, which are inevitable at a time of profound reforms.

My aim is stability.

Minister Denies Urging Rapprochement With Russia

WS2309071893 Tallinn BNS in English 0853 GMT 22 Sep 93

[Text] Vilnius, Sept 22, BNS—Povilas Gylys, Lithuania's foreign minister, denied a Sept. 17 statement by Vytautas Landsbergis, leader of the parliament's rightist opposition.

Gylys circulated his own statement Sept. 21. The foreign minister claims he was accused of saying in his nonexistent Sept. 16 statement that Lithuania "needs special rapprochement with Russia, which should take place as soon as possible."

The foreign minister says he never mentioned "rapprochement with Russia." Gylys adds that accusations of willingness to make Lithuania a satellite and to start a new invasion of Russian troops increases political tension and damages the country's prestige in the world.

Former Soviet General Arrested for Jan 1991 Events

LD2209212893 Vilnius Radio Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 21 Sep 93

[Text] The Lithuanian special services have arrested former Soviet General Ginutis Taurinskas in Vilnius. He is suspected of taking part in the January events in 1991. Until the restoration of independence Ginutis Taurinskas has been heading the Lithuanian branch of the Soviet paramilitary organization DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for Assisting the Air Force, Army, and Navy]. After the restoration of independence, this organization was replaced by the Vytis sport and technical club of the National Defense Department.

In January, when the Soviet Army started occupying various buildings, the Vytis building was the first to be occupied. The DOSAAF organization established there was headed up to the August putsch by Gen. Ginuitis Taurinskas. He is also suspected of taking part in the occupation of the Vilnius Technical School.

According to the newspaper LIETUVOS RYTAS although a warrant for the general's arrest was signed in the spring of last year, he was found and arrested only now.

Ginutis Taurinskas is a Lithuanian. He formerly lived with his family in Vilnius, but he did not apply for Lithuanian citizenship. Last Friday a Russian passport was issued to him at the consular section of the Russian Embassy, but he did not manage to collect it. Ginutis Taurinskas is now in solitary confinement at the Lukiskes prison [in Vilnius] and is to be charged within the next 10 days.

Slezevicius Says Talks With Japanese Leader 'Fruitful'

LD2109233893 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in English 1900 GMT 21 Sep 93

[Text] Lithuanian Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius has evaluated as fruitful his meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa, which lasted twice as long as planned. Mr. Slezevicius told the ITAR-TASS agency that his discussions with his Japanese counterpart covered mainly economic and political cooperation between the two states. In the opinion of the Lithuanian prime minister, so far there is in principle no economic relations between Lithuania and Japan. One of the major goals of the Lithuanian delegation's visit to Tokyo was to consult on economic and technical assistance to Lithuania.

These issues were touched upon during the delegation's meeting with ex-Japanese Prime Minister Noburu Takeshita, influential politicians as well as leaders of (?greatest) Japanese trade corporations and economic organizations.

As a result, Lithuania was granted a $45 million loan through the Japanese Import-Export Bank.

Prosecutor General Denies Report of Currency Transfer

WS2109135893 Tallinn BNS in English 1818 GMT 20 Sep 93

[Text] VILNIUS, Sept 20, BNS—Lithuania's Prosecutor General Arturas Paulauskas denied reports in the press that a huge sum in hard currency was unlawfully transferred by the Prosecutor General's Office to a personal account in France.

The prosecutor general said he will make an official statement at a parliament session Tuesday [21 September].

The newspaper LIETUVOS RYTAS published a story about a new "financial scandal" Saturday. The newspaper says the prosecutor's office transferred nearly 166 million U.S. dollars to France for unknown purposes in late August.

In an interview with Lithuanian TV the prosecutor general said the dollars were purchased for money received from state funds. He explained that the sum was allocated to buy 16 Peugeots for the prosecutor's office. The money was transferred to a personal account in France on request of a Lithuanian dealer who sold the cars.

Paulauskas claims a French firm confirmed that the money is received and the Peugeots will be delivered on time.

The newspaper supposes that the emerging financial scandal may be related to the fact that the prosecutor's office brought in a charge against Romualdas Visokavicius, Lithuania's central bank chairman who is accused

of abusing his authority, and virtually does nothing to investigate the involvement of his predecessor Vilius Baldisis in the litas-printing scandal.

LIETUVOS RYTAS says the sum may have been paid by the former central bank leadership to start a case against Visokavicius. Baldisis and one of the former central bank vice chairmen work at the commercial Aurabankas bank which earlier kept 0.5 million dollars of the "prosecutor" money in its depositories. The money was later transferred to France.

The newspaper claims Baldisis may want the chief banker's resignation to conceal a number of documents which may clear up many things in the Lithuanian money-printing case.

Little Impact Seen From Nuclear Plant Accident

WS2309085493 Vilnius ELTA NEWS BULLETIN in English 1703 GMT 22 Sep 93

[From ELTA "NEWS BULLETIN" No. 337]

[Text] Vilnius, Sept 21, ELTA—An accident that took place in Ignalina nuclear power plant last Sunday [19 September] will not have such an influence on Lithuanian energy system as journalists forecast, senior controller on duty of state energy system Sigitas Smilgevicius told ELTA.

Losses of energy caused by stoppage of the plant are compensated by Elektrenai power plant, working in its usual minimal regime, Kruonis hydroaccumulating, Mazeikiai thermal- and Kaunas hydro-electric power plants. Electricity from Latvia is received only in extremal hours.